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This study examines the efficiency of resource reallocation within multisegment 
firms. A defining feature of multisegment firms is management’s ability to transfer 
resources across divisions. Although the option to use the proceeds or cash flows from 
one division of the firm to finance operations in another division is valuable to a firm, a 
large stream of literature documents potentially value-destroying consequences when 
agency conflicts interfere with investment decisions. Research to date provides mixed 
results as to whether multisegment firms reallocate resources efficiently. The extent that 
managers’ resource reallocation decisions reflect improvements in efficiency is relevant 
to firms’ existing and potential stakeholders. The reallocation of resources within firms 
provides new information about factors that underlie firm value, such as growth 
opportunities and risk exposure. To assess the efficiency of firms’ resource allocation 
decisions, I create two unique, composite measures of efficiency that combine the 
performance of each segment relative to a firm’s other segments and the segment’s 
industry lifecycle stage. I examine the association between these measures and changes in 
the assets allocated to each of the firm’s segments. I also investigate the influence of 
corporate governance factors. When financing occurs in-house, the firm has greater 
incentives to monitor the use of funds. Therefore, the ability of a firm’s corporate 
governance structure to alleviate agency problems should be related to the efficiency of 
management’s resource allocation decisions. Additionally, the greater complexity 
 iv 
 
inherent in operating in multiple segments increases demands on firms’ governance 
systems, making the efficiency of resource reallocation and the influence of related 
governance mechanisms important empirical questions. 
Using segment data provided under SFAS No. 131, I find that firms reallocate 
resources to segments with the best comparative advantages within the firm, suggesting 
that multisegment firms, on average, reallocate resources efficiently. Additionally, I find 
that firms with more independent boards more quickly reallocate resources away from 
segments with lower within-firm comparative advantages than do firms with more 
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A defining feature of multisegment or conglomerate firms is management’s 
ability to transfer resources across divisions. The option to redeploy or reallocate 
resources is valuable to firms as proceeds or cash flows from one division can finance 
investment opportunities of other, potentially cash-constrained divisions. At the same 
time, however, managers can abuse the option to cross-subsidize operations. A large 
literature documents adverse, value-destroying consequences when agency conflicts 
interfere with efficient investment strategies. For example, Jensen’s free cash flow theory 
suggests that managers misappropriate excess cash through investments that are costly to 
shareholders yet lead to personal gain for managers (Jensen, 1986; and see Stein, 2003 
for a survey).  
Studies show that firms actively reallocate resources across divisions (e.g., Billett 
& Mauer, 2003); however, research to date provides mixed results as to whether 
multisegment firms do so efficiently. In this study, I examine two research questions 
using a unique approach to measure efficiency that rests on an evaluation of segments’ 
comparative advantages within firms. My first research question is: Do firms reallocate 
resources across segments in a relatively efficient manner? My second research question 




The methodology I use to evaluate efficiency represents an important departure from 
prior literature that benchmarks the efficiency of multisegment firms relative to a set of 
arguably noncomparable, single-segment firms.   
I find that firms reallocate resources to segments with the best within-firm 
comparative advantages, suggesting that, on average, multisegment firms reallocate 
resources efficiently.1 Furthermore, I find that the presence of an independent board of 
directors is positively associated with efficiency in across-segment resource reallocation. 
Specifically, firms with a higher percentage of independent board members more quickly 
reallocate resources away from segments with lower within-firm comparative advantages 
than firms with more affiliated or dependent boards.   
I define efficient resource reallocations as those giving priority to segments with 
the greatest within-firm comparative advantage. To proxy for this construct, I first 
compare the return on assets of the firm’s segment(s) to the weighted average return on 
assets of the firm’s remaining segment(s). To enrich my measures and account for 
situations where the economic environment might cause a segment’s ROA to be a 
misleading signal of a relative comparative advantage (for example, in a rapidly growing 
industry, high start-up costs can lead to excessively low ROAs), I condition the ROA 
component of my measures on the industry lifecycle stage of each segment. I then 
examine whether changes in the resources allocated to segments vary with my ex ante 
predictions of efficient within-firm resource reallocation.   
I use the Compustat segment file as a primary data source for information that 
reflects the resource reallocation processes within firms. Overall, a lack of publically 
                                                 
1Throughout the text I use the term “reallocate” rather than “allocate” to be consistent with the changes 




available data makes large-scale investigation of within-firm decisions problematic. 
However, U.S. companies are required to disclose information on segment assets, capital 
expenditures, and profit or loss and its significant components such as revenue and 
depreciation.2  
In general, accounting provides information that guides capital investment 
(Zhang, 2000). Supporting this, an emerging literature addresses investment efficiency at 
a firm-level (e.g., Biddle & Hilary, 2006; Biddle, Hilary & Verdi, 2009; Bushman, 
Piotroski & Smith, 2009; Richardson, 2006). Furthermore, Chen and Zhang (2003) 
provide evidence of the incremental value relevance of segment data beyond firm-level 
data. This study fills a gap in the literature by examining the efficiency of within-firm or 
segment-level investment. 
In summary, corporate investment decisions are described as the most important 
firm-specific decisions managers make (Harris & Raviv, 1996, among others). The 
reallocation of resources among divisions signals investment priorities and should reflect 
rational strategic adaptations to changes in firms’ economic environments; however, 
intrafirm negotiations and other agency-driven conflicts can lead to suboptimal 
investment choices. Additionally, the greater complexity inherent in operating in multiple 
industries increases demands on firms’ governance structures, making the efficiency of 
resource reallocation and the influence of governance mechanisms important empirical 
questions. Accordingly, my paper provides evidence that should be of interest to 
                                                 
2Specifically, SFAS No. 131 requires disclosure of “the divisions, departments, subsidiaries, or other 
internal units that the chief operating decision-maker uses to make operating decisions and to assess an 
enterprise’s performance,” and “specific amounts would be allocated to segments only if they were 
allocated in reports used by the chief operating decision-maker for the evaluation of segment performance” 
(FASB, 1997). However, segment data are not without limitations; foremost is the discretion allowed in 





managers and investors, as well as other academic researchers interested in assessing the 
relative efficiency of within-firm resource reallocation decisions.    
The remainder of my dissertation is organized as follows. I review the related 
literature in Chapter 2 and develop my hypotheses in Chapter 3. I present my research 
design and empirical proxies in Chapter 4. I describe the sample used in this study in 








       
      











                                           
                                            
                                                  
Resource Reallocation and Efficiency 
 
Prior literature addresses various aspects of efficient and inefficient resource 
reallocations at the firm and segment levels. In this section, I discuss this literature and its 
implications for my study. 
Managers reallocate resources within their firms for a variety of economically 
rational reasons. First, firms shift resources among divisions to utilize excess capacity, 
reduce costs, or eliminate redundancies in hopes that more streamlined operations 
translate into greater profitability. Firms also reallocate resources to take advantage of 
opportunities, for example, to enter new markets. Matsusaka (2001) models value-
maximizing firms as those that align managerial capabilities with available opportunities. 
Thus firms redistribute resources toward more promising activities or markets, 
particularly when a compatible within-firm skill set is also present.  
Other theoretical work describes similar “synergistic” and positive impacts from 
firm diversification tactics which imply resource reallocations within firms. In Gomes 
and Livdan (2004), firms diversify to either take advantage of economies of scope as 




value as they represent benefits that are not easily replicated by shareholders’ portfolio 
strategies.    
  Firms might also strategically reallocate resources to obstruct competition or 
otherwise maintain market power (Palepu, 1985). For example, when supply of an input 
is constrained, reciprocal buying and selling among the divisions of a firm can pressure 
rivals and strengthen barriers to entry. Strategic balancing of activities within a firm can 
also lessen risk and potentially reduce taxes when the income streams of divisions 
complement one another (Berger & Ofek, 1995). In addition, because internal funds are 
less costly to secure than outside debt or equity financing, and management is presumed 
to know more about investment opportunities within their firms than external sources of 
funds would, the reallocation of resources within a firm allows credit-constrained firms to 
cross-finance good projects (Stein, 1997).3   
Despite the arguments for rational redistribution of resources, a large literature 
suggests that agency conflicts and capital market imperfections might motivate managers 
to reallocate resources for noneconomic reasons. Inefficient behaviors include empire-
building, where CEOs have a preference for running large firms and garnering increased 
compensation (Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Murphy, 1990); and managerial entrenchment, 
where CEOs invest in projects that are costly to shareholders but further CEOs’ job 
security (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Central to these conflicts is the notion that managers 
pursue selfish objectives at the expense of less-informed providers of capital (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Thus, although in a frictionless environment capital flows to its best 
use, information asymmetry and agency costs can interfere with optimal capital 
                                                 
3Stein (1997) stresses that the informational advantage argument is more salient when diversification is into 
related businesses. Headquarters is then better able to judge the relative merits of competing projects, and 




reallocation regardless of whether the provider of capital resides within or outside of the 
firm.  
This dissertation focuses on resource reallocations across divisions of 
multisegment or conglomerate firms. In multisegment firms, divisional managers might 
be better informed than company headquarters about the prospects of their divisions but 
have incentives that are not aligned with those of top management. For example, 
divisional managers might provide imperfect information or simply not work as hard if 
they believe that profits from their division will be distributed to other divisions, as is 
possible with an active internal capital market (Rajan, Servaes & Zingales, 2000). Other 
evidence is consistent with divisional managers preferring control over larger operations 
and engaging in lobbying activities to secure additional resources (Meyer, Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992; Wulf, 2009). The primary consequences of agency conflicts at a divisional 
level include inefficiencies due to information-sharing problems and wasted resources. 
Ultimately, the CEO is responsible for overseeing the distribution of funds among 
the firm’s competing investment opportunities, a task Stein (1997) calls “winner-
picking.”4 However, as an agent of the shareholders, the CEO avoids bearing the full 
costs of inefficient resource reallocation. A large body of literature examines misaligned 
incentives between CEOs and shareholders. In the end, shareholders cannot 
“contractually protect the operating budget from abuse by the CEO” (Scharfstein & Stein, 
2000). Consequently, inefficient resource reallocation within multisegment firms can 
occur as a result of agency conflicts at either the CEO or divisional manager level, or 
                                                 
4A related stream of literature examines transfer pricing schemes, compensation contracts and other capital 
budgeting mechanisms that CEOs can rely on to address incentive and information-sharing problems within 
firms (e.g., Harris, Kriebel & Raviv, 1985). However, the responsibility for the implementation and 




both. Scharfstein and Stein (2000) develop a two-tiered model illustrating how a CEO’s 
ability to compensate divisional managers with cash and/or additional resources allocated 
to the division can lead to socialism (a familiar form of inefficiency where stronger 
segments cross-subsidize weaker segments).  
 
 
Internal Capital Markets 
 
The line of work most closely related to my dissertation investigates the 
efficiency of firms’ internal capital markets. In an internal capital market, the proceeds or 
cash flows from one division of the firm can be used to finance other divisions. Unlike 
capital providers in an external capital market, the provider of capital within the firm (for 
simplicity, hereafter called headquarters or HQ) maintains complete control rights over 
the firm’s assets. This has two implications for my study: First, HQ has greater 
monitoring incentives (Gertner, Scharfstein & Stein, 1994); and second, unlike external 
providers of capital such as a bank that would gain rights over the firm’s assets only in 
the event of default, HQ has the authority and, in effect, the responsibility to exercise 
options to redeploy, adapt or abandon operations in efforts to meet strategic and 
operational goals.  
My study differs from prior studies of efficiency in internal capital markets in the 
methodology and overall focus. The internal capital market studies of the past 2 decades 
typically contrast the investment efficiency of single versus multisegment firms with the 
aim of identifying potential sources of what is commonly referred to as the diversification 
discount. The diversification discount is an observed empirical regularity in which 




segment firms (Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lang & Stulz, 1994). Until recently, inefficient 
investment behavior within multisegment firms was thought to be a primary driver of the 
diversification discount. Empirical results consistently tied conglomerate firms’ 
overinvestment in divisions with lower investment opportunities at the expense of 
investment in divisions with higher opportunities with lower firm value.  
Recent literature argues against this conclusion, however, by demonstrating that 
unaccounted-for self-selection in the decision to diversify can erroneously produce the 
conclusion that operating in multiple industries destroys firm value (Campa & Kedia, 
2002; Villalonga, 2004a). For example, a valuation discount might be due to underlying 
firm characteristics, and these same characteristics might lead the firm to diversify; 
however, it is incorrect to conclude that diversification is responsible for an observed 
discount. In Matsusaka’s (2001) model, underperformance in existing activities causes 
firms to diversify in search of new, productive opportunities. Other studies provide 
alternative explanations for an observed valuation discount in multisegment firms. For 
example, firms might acquire already discounted divisions (Graham, Lemmon & Wolf, 
2002).    
While prior literature ultimately does not yield a resource reallocation-based 
explanation for the diversification discount, the literature provides evidence, albeit 
mixed, about the efficiency of firms’ internal capital markets. Numerous studies illustrate 
potential inefficiencies in the functioning of internal capital markets. Empirical results 
often show that better performing divisions subsidize poorly performing divisions, 
thereby rejecting the null hypotheses that divisions with the best prospects receive 




Nonetheless, the conventional proxy used in these studies to measure the degree 
of a division’s investment opportunities (an estimate of Tobin’s q), has been illustrated to 
be subject to severe measurement error that directly impacts the results of studies 
investigating investment efficiency (Whited, 2001). Among other issues, concern 
revolves around estimates of Tobin’s q calculated using single-segment firms that are 
then applied to multisegment firms (Chevalier, 2000). With endogeneity prevalent in the 
decision to diversify, it is unclear that the median q of single-segment firms adequately 
proxies for the growth opportunities of multisegment firms (Campa & Kedia, 2002, 
among others). Nevertheless, this proxy is common in the segment and firm 
diversification literature because market value, which is necessary to calculate Tobin’s q, 
is not available at the segment level.  
Importantly for my study, the q-based measures employed in prior research do not 
incorporate the interdependence or relative project selection that occurs in multisegment 
firms with limited resources (Stein, 1997). For example, studies that assign an industry q 
to firms’ divisions assume that all firms in that industry have the same future prospects 
regardless of each firm’s other operations and divisional prospects. Thus, two important 
features separate my study from much of the prior literature on the efficiency of internal 
capital markets. First, I use an approach to measuring efficiency that does not require an 
estimate of q.5 Second, my measure takes the relative performance of firms’ segments 
into consideration in assessing the efficiency of project selection.  
Contrary to the arguments noted earlier that internal capital markets degrade 
efficiency, theory posits that internal capital markets should reallocate resources more 
                                                 
5Although my measures of efficiency do not call for estimates of Q, I include an estimate of segment Q 




efficiently because HQ holds an informational advantage over external capital markets 
regarding the firms’ investment prospects (Stein, 1997; Williamson, 1975). More 
recently, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) present a model and empirical evidence that 
optimal growth across industries in diversified manufacturing firms reflects efficient 
responses to changes in plant productivity. Khanna and Tice (2001) examine discount 
retailers’ response to a negative shock (Walmart’s entry into their market), and report that 
for related diversification, active internal markets appear to transfer resources away from 
divisions with worsening prospects, suggesting efficient investment decisions. Although 
illustrative, the Khanna and Tice study’s results suffer from generalizability as well as 
doubt as to whether Walmart’s entry into a market is exogenous and unanticipated, two 
key assumptions of the study’s research design (Sapienza, 2001). 




Firms use the mechanisms of a corporate governance system to restrain or 
discipline the managerial decision-making process. This section discusses the 
implications of prior corporate governance literature on within-firm investment decisions, 
including the efficiency of internal capital markets. Two key theoretical models—Rajan 
et al., 2000; Scharfstein and Stein, 2000—point to agency problems as the primary source 
of inefficient internal capital markets. Additionally, studies find that firms with 
characteristics indicative of relatively weaker governance structures tend to have greater 
agency problems (Core, Holthausen & Larker, 1999). Therefore, work in this area 
generally hypothesizes a positive association between governance mechanisms and the 




Indeed, studies have found that firms with more concentrated ownership have 
more efficient internal capital markets (Sautner & Villalonga, 2010); that suboptimal 
investment behavior is associated with low managerial ownership (Ozbas & Scharfstein, 
2010), and finally, Datta, D’Mello and Iskandar-Datta (2009) find that managerial equity-
based compensation is associated with more efficient internal capital markets. Overall 
these findings suggest that differences in the efficiency of firms’ internal capital markets 
are associated with differences in managerial incentives, and that governance plays a 
moderating role. 
Monitoring mechanisms help fill the gap left by incomplete contracting and 
therefore represent vital components of firms’ governance systems. Multisegment firms 
can avoid some types of monitoring, such as external monitoring by debt holders or 
shareholders, with the use of an internal capital market. When financing occurs within the 
firm, HQ retains asset control rights and HQ has greater incentives to monitor the use of 
funds. Asset control rights represent the authority to redistribute assets among segments. 
Although powerful incentives are backed by the potential for real action by HQ, tensions 
specific to the conglomerate form suggest that a reliance on internal capital markets 
comes at a cost. Other tensions or agency costs include poor investment choices resulting 
from intrafirm bargaining. Even if such departmental bargaining for additional resources 
is unsuccessful, wasted time and effort represent a form of inefficiency (Scharfstein & 
Stein, 2000) Additionally, misaligned incentives among divisional managers exist when 
HQ cannot ensure that profits earned by one division will remain in that division (Rajan 




The composition of the board of directors is an important feature of effective 
corporate governance (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010). Firms appoint outsiders to 
the board of directors to increase monitoring of the CEO (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Outside 
directors often bring specific expertise, and the lower allegiance of independent board 
members translates into a lower tolerance of managerial decisions that might signify 
misaligned incentives between the shareholders and the CEO. This can be valuable in 
situations where the potential for misaligned incentives is greater. Consistent with this, 
Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994), among others, provide evidence that the actions of 
outside directors are aligned with the interests of shareholders and therefore represent an 
effective monitoring mechanism.  
Although outside directors might be less sympathetic to CEO incentives, 
questions arise as to whether they have adequate knowledge about the firm and its 
operating environment to both effectively monitor the CEO and have a positive impact on 
firm value. Studies find that outside directors are not at an information disadvantage 
regarding firm activities, despite their “outside” designation (Ravina & Sapienza, 2010). 
Similarly, Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) find that outside directorship has a 
significant impact on firm performance, although the impact is tempered by the 
complexity of firms’ information environments. Multisegment firms can create 
informational challenges, and a related stream of literature, discussed next, examines the 
relationship between firm diversification and corporate governance. 
Overall, firms operating multiple segments exacerbate monitoring and 
information-sharing problems, which places greater demands on governance systems 




governance structures vary with the degree of firm diversification (Anderson, Bates, 
Bizjak & Lemmon, 2000). More specifically, the authors find CEO pay is less sensitive 
to performance in more complex or diversified firms, and these CEOs have lower stock 
ownership. Likewise, in linking agency costs to diversification strategies, Denis, Denis 
and Sarin (1997) find that higher managerial and block ownership are associated with 
lower levels of diversification. These studies imply that the importance of effective 
corporate governance mechanisms increases with firm diversification.  
The law requires all publically traded firms in the U.S. to appoint a board of 
directors. Beyond an advisory role, the scope of the board’s duties includes hiring, 
compensating and, if necessary, replacing the CEO. Therefore, monitoring by the board 
of directors is effective when the possibility of negative repercussions, such as loss of job 
or reputation, confines managers to act in accordance with shareholders’ interests. In 
efforts to boost protection of shareholders’ interests, recent NYSE and NASDAQ 
regulation changes tightened corporate governance requirements regarding board 
independence in order to enhance board effectiveness.6 
Although I found no prior literature directly linking board independence to the 
efficiency of within-firm resource reallocation, prior studies point to implications of 
outside directorship on other aspects of business operations. Weisbach (1988) finds that 
for poorly performing firms, CEO turnover is more likely with a more independent board. 
Additionally, the probability of adding independent directors increases after poor 
performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Byrd and Hickman (1992) find a positive 
impact of independent boards in a study on the market for corporate control. Specifically, 
                                                 
6See SEC ruling “NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance,” in 




they find the value loss of acquiring firms is significantly less when the board consists of 
a majority of outsiders. These studies point to board independence as an important feature 
of monitoring effectiveness. Monitoring effectiveness, in turn, implies more efficient 




       
      













The goal of this study is to better understand one aspect of managers’ investment 
decisions, namely the efficiency of resource reallocation across firms’ divisions. The 
topic is economically relevant, as multisegment firms account for more than half of U.S. 
economic productivity (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2009). Additionally, approximately 
three-fourths of the financing for ongoing operations of multisegment firms is generated 
internally (MacKie-Mason, 1990). Casual observation that the multisegment 
organizational form continues to proliferate is consistent with the argument that 
conglomerate firms are not entirely inefficient. However, on the one hand, empirical and 
theoretical evidence suggests that the within-firm reallocation processes of multisegment 
firms are prone to inefficiencies due to agency costs. On the other hand, empirical and 
theoretical evidence also supports the opposite conclusion: that informational advantages 
within conglomerate firms, coupled with the availability of internally generated 
financing, can lead to more efficient resource reallocations. Therefore, I provide new 
evidence on the debate by testing the following hypothesis (stated in alternate form): 
 





As noted earlier, when financing occurs within the firm, HQ has greater incentive 
to monitor the use of funds than would an outside provider of funds, partly because HQ 
retains asset control rights and therefore the wherewithal to redistribute the assets. 
Additionally, operating in multiple industries can complicate the monitoring role relative 
to single-segment firms (Bushman et al., 2004). Thus, from a corporate governance 
standpoint, the more important task of monitoring (more important because funding takes 
place internally) is more demanding in a conglomerate setting.  
A model by Scharfstein and Stein (2000) implies that inefficient resource 
reallocations are more likely to occur when managers have weaker incentives to 
maximize shareholder value. CEO self-interest, particularly protection of their reputation, 
the amount of resources they command, and their compensation, can contribute to a 
reluctance to efficiently alter the scope of operations within the firm. For example, CEOs 
of larger, more diversified organizations earn higher wages (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), 
creating disincentives to reduce firm size. Boot (1992) finds that bad managers fail to 
abandon losing projects in a timely manner, as this would expose their poor project 
selection, potentially damaging the manager’s reputation. Likewise, in an examination of 
capital structure and financial distress, Ofek (1993) documents that entrenched managers 
avoid taking operational actions such as asset restructuring. More generally, prior 
literature finds that managers delay acknowledging bad news (Kothari, Shu & Wysocki, 
2009). Under these circumstances, managerial action is likely inconsistent with 
shareholder value maximization. 
The board of directors, an essential governance mechanism, has the primary 




assets under a manager’s control, up to and including CEO dismissal. Turnover of top 
management is a pervasive response of financially distressed firms (Gilson, 1989), and 
prior literature finds CEO turnover is more sensitive to performance when the board of 
directors is more independent (Weisbach, 1988).  
One goal of corporate governance is to alleviate agency problems. This, in turn 
should lead to more efficient resource reallocation decisions. This leads to my second 
hypothesis:  
 





       
      













Hypothesis 1 predicts that on average, diversified firms efficiently reallocate 
resources across segments. In this study, I define efficiency in terms of giving priority to 
segments with the greatest within-firm comparative advantage. To proxy for this 
construct, I compare the industry-adjusted return on assets of each segment to the 
weighted average industry-adjusted return on assets of the firm’s remaining segment(s), 
and evaluate the comparison conditional on the industry lifecycle stage of each segment. 
  I characterize efficient reallocation choices by the variables KEEP and DROP. 
KEEP is an indicator variable assigned a one when a segment’s time t-1 industry-adjusted 
ROA is greater than the weighted average industry-adjusted ROA of the firms’ remaining 
segments and the segment’s industry lifecycle stage is classified as nondeclining (defined 
below), and a zero otherwise. When the KEEP indicator equals one, both the segment’s 
within-firm profitability advantage and the segment’s industry characteristics suggest that 
it is favorable (i.e., efficient) to preserve or increase resources to the segment. I provide a 
more in-depth discussion of KEEP in the next section of the paper. 
The variable DROP identifies situations where an efficient resource reallocation 
relinquishes operations or reduces resources allocated to a given segment. The DROP 




less than the weighted average industry-adjusted ROA of the firms’ remaining segments 
and the segment’s industry lifecycle stage is classified as nongrowing (defined below), 
and a zero otherwise. Under the DROP scenario both the segment’s within-firm 
profitability disadvantage and the segment’s industry fundamentals suggest that it is 
unfavorable or inefficient to maintain operations in this segment. I provide a more in-
depth discussion of DROP in the next section of the paper. 
 
 
Efficiency of Resource Reallocation 
 
I test whether segment-level resource reallocations vary with KEEP and DROP by 
estimating the following model:     
 
INVEST = α0 + α1 KEEPijt-1 + α2 DROPijt-1 + α3 SEGLIQijt + α4 LEVjt-1  
+ α5LN (MVE) jt  +α6MBjt + α7FIRMCFjt + α8∆X_FINjt + α9SEGQijt  
+ α10SEGNjt + α11SEGCFijt + α12DROPijt-1 * LIQijt + α13 KEEPijt-1 * LEVjt-1  
+ α14 KEEPijt -1* FIRMCFjt  + Σ Year Indicator + Σ Industry Indicator + εijt      (1) 
 
Where INVEST is one of two dependent variables including:  
%∆ΑΤijt = the percentage change from year t-1 to year t in total assets 
allocated to segment i of firm j.  
 
%∆RSSijt = the percentage change from year t-1 to year t in relative segment 
size of segment i of firm j where relative segment size equals total 




KEEPijt-1 = an indicator variable set to one when segment i of firm j has a 
high relative industry-adjusted ROA and is in a nondeclining 




segment operating profit scaled by segment assets. Industry 
adjusting subtracts the industry median from the segment value 
where industry medians are calculated using the contemporaneous 
Compustat population of pure play (i.e., single segment) firms in 
the same three-digit NAICS code. This variable is more fully 
described in the following section. 
 
DROPijt-1 = an indicator variable set to one when segment i of firm j has a 
low relative industry-adjusted ROA and is in a nongrowth 
industry, and zero otherwise. Segment ROA is time t-1 segment 
operating profit scaled by segment assets. Industry adjusting 
subtracts the industry median from the segment value where 
industry medians are calculated using the contemporaneous 
Compustat population of pure play or single segment firms in the 
same three-digit NAICS code. This variable is more fully 
described in the following section. 
 
I include the following firm- and segment-level control variables shown in prior research 
to influence firm investment behavior:  
Firm-Level Controls:  
LEVjt-1 = firm j’s one-year lagged debt-to-equity ratio (Compustat 
DLTT/CEQ). 
 
LN (MVE) jt = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity of firm j at 
time t. The market value of equity is calculated as annual fiscal 
year-end closing price * common shares outstanding (Compustat 
PRCC_C * CSHO). 
 
MBjt = market-to-book equity ratio of firm j at time t (Compustat 
(PRCC_C * CSHO)/CEQ). 
   
FIRMCFjt = cash flow of firm j at time t measured as operating activities-net 
cash flow less cash dividends scaled by average total assets 
(Compustat (OANCF – DV)/AT).  
 
∆X_FINjt = the net amount of cash flow from external financing sources of 
firm j at time t calculated as net change in equity plus the net 
change in debt, scaled by average assets. The change in equity is 
the net cash received from the sale (and/or purchase) of common 
and preferred stock less cash dividends paid (Compustat SSTK - 




received from the issuance (or reduction) of debt (Compustat 
DLTIS – DLTR + DLCCH).7 
 
SEGNjt = the number of segments that firm j reports at time t as 
determined by unique segment identifiers (SID) in the Compustat 
segment files. The number is adjusted to reflect only economically 





SEGLIQijt = the liquidity or tangibility of segment i of firm j assets at time t 
measured as the industry median of current assets less current 
liabilities scaled by property, plant and equipment (Compustat 
(ACT – LCT) / PPENT). Industry medians are calculated using the 
contemporaneous Compustat population of single-segment firms in 
the same three-digit NAICS codes.   
 
SEGQijt = estimate of segment i of firm j growth opportunities at time t 
calculated as the industry median market-to-book asset ratio 
(Compustat (AT - CEQ + (PRCC_F * CSHO))/AT). Industry 
medians are calculated using the contemporaneous Compustat 
population of single-segment firms in the same three-digit NAICS 
codes.   
 
SEGCFijt = an estimate of segment i of firm j cash flows at time t calculated 




 KEEP and DROP8 are the variables of interest. A positive coefficient on KEEP 
(α1) provides support for H1 since an efficient resource reallocation would ramp up, 
preserve or “keep” operations in segments with the best comparative advantages within 
the firm after controlling for any mechanical effect on segment resources due to results of 
segment operations. A negative coefficient on DROP (α2) also provides support for H1, 
since an efficient resource reallocation decision would be to reduce operations in 
segments with little within-firm comparative advantage; again, after controlling for any 
                                                 
7This measure follows Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan (2006). 




mechanical effect on segment resources due to results of segment operations. I test these 
decisions separately because the efficiency of managers’ decisions might differ between 
investment and disinvestment. Specifically, as discussed earlier, managers generally have 
personal incentives to grow, as opposed to shrink, their operations. Accordingly, I expect 
agency costs might play a greater role in the DROP decision. Next, I discuss the 
construction of KEEP and DROP in detail. 
 
 
Empirical Proxies for Efficiency 
Conceptually, efficient resource reallocation is a function of fundamental industry 
factors and resource reallocation that gives priority to segments with the greatest within-
firm comparative advantage (Maksimovic & Phillips 2002). In this section I describe two 
measures, KEEP and DROP, which proxy for this construct. The measures capture the 
intersection between profitability and growth opportunities, which are widely understood 
to be two key determinants of investment decisions (Chen & Zhang, 2003).  
As noted above, the first component of KEEP and DROP is the segment’s within-
firm comparative advantage. KEEP is the ex ante prediction that firms maintain or 
increase resources to a segment; and DROP is the ex ante prediction that firms drop or 
relinquish operations in a segment.  
To determine the first component of KEEP and DROP, I follow Billett and Mauer 
(2003) and Berger and Hann (2007) in arguing that a segment that underperforms relative 
to the firm’s remaining segments is likely an “inefficient” segment. I focus on firms’ 
ROA because the appropriateness of investing or divesting operations is partially 




I calculate each segment’s industry-adjusted return on assets less the weighted average 
industry-adjusted return on assets of the firm’s remaining segments (Billett & Mauer, 
2003). I designate an indicator variable for High Relative ROA (Low Relative ROA) 
equal to one if the segment’s industry-adjusted ROA is greater (less) than the weighted 
average ROA of the firm’s remaining segments, and zero otherwise.  
While it might be intuitive to expect firms to keep (drop) segments with high 
(low) relative ROAs, it is easy to point to scenarios where this. as a one-dimensional 
measure of efficiency. is insufficient. Consider a firm with a high-tech division with 
significant growth opportunities but low earnings. Using relative ROA alone will 
incorrectly assess additional resources to this division as inefficient (that is, if the firm 
has division(s) with better ROA(s)). I incorporate industry fundamentals, as described 
next, to minimize this type of measurement error and enrich my efficiency measures. 
The second component of KEEP and DROP is the segment’s industry lifecycle 
stage. The benefits of internal capital markets have been shown to differ across lifecycle 
stages. For example, the value of reallocating resources is likely to be greatest for 
conglomerate firms with one or more high-growth, low-cash-generating divisions 
(Maksimovic & Phillips, 2008; Schoar, 2002). As noted earlier, the existence of an 
internal capital market allows conglomerate firms the option to use cash flows from one 
segment to more economically finance other, potentially cash-constrained segments.  
Firm investment strategies also differ greatly across industry lifecycle stages. 
High-growth operations might require large, strategically preemptive capital 




Each segment is assigned one of four industry lifecycle stages: growth, 
technological change, consolidation or decline (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2008). The 
lifecycle stages are based on long-run changes in demand as proxied for by growth in 
sales and long-run changes in the number of producers in an industry.9 I calculate a 
lifecycle stage for each three-digit NAICS industry, and assign each segment a lifecycle 
stage based on the segment’s primary three-digit NAICS code. However, I allow for 
imprecision in the “technological change” and “consolidation” lifecycle stages, and 
instead use “nongrowth” to include the decline, technological change and consolidation 
lifecycle stages, and “nondecline” to refer to operations in growth, technological change 
and consolidation lifecycle stages. Because divisional ROAs are either greater than or 
less than the weighted average ROAs of the firm’s remaining segments, this methodology 
does not result in nonuniqueness of the classification for divisions in the technological 
change and consolidation lifecycle stages.10 Interestingly, and lessening any possible 
unintended impact of this research design choice, as reported in Appendix C, the majority 
of segment observations fall into the growth (39%) or decline (43%) stages.   
KEEP (DROP) is designed to capture situations where combinations of a within-
firm profitability advantage (disadvantage) and industry fundamentals unambiguously 
point toward keeping (dropping) operations in a segment. Consequently, a grey area 
exists when the two components together offer an ambiguous prediction. Under these 
scenarios, the segment’s resource reallocation is not explicitly defined as efficient or 
inefficient. For example, under certain circumstances, it might be efficient to reduce 
                                                 
9Appendix B provides additional detail on the calculation of industry lifecycle stages, and Appendix C 
presents the distribution of segments used in this study by industry lifecycle stage. 
10The possible scenario of a segment’s ROA equaling the weighted average ROA of the firm’s remaining 




resources in a growth segment, but my measures never assert this. Instead, the measures 
remain neutral. The possible existence of such classification errors reduces the power of 
my analysis and works against my ability to document a statistically significant result. 
Combining the lifecycle stage and relative performance indicator variables, the 
KEEP variable is set to equal one when a segment has a relatively high industry-adjusted 
ROA and the segment is in a nondeclining industry lifecycle stage. In segments with both 
of these characteristics, an efficient resource reallocation retains or increases resources 
allocated to the segment. Clearly, firms efficiently keep operations in other combinations 
of a relative ROA * industry lifecycle stage matrix. As described above, it may (or may 
not) be efficient to keep a segment with relatively poor performance in a growing 
industry. The intuition behind KEEP is that it is likely inefficient for a firm to dispose of 
segments that are outperforming the firm’s other segment(s) when these segments are in 
an industry that is not declining. Thus, KEEP (DROP) is assigned a one in situations that 
explicitly point to growing (relinquishing) resources in these operations, and zero 
otherwise.  
Overall, if managers’ decisions are relatively efficient, I expect KEEP to be 
positively correlated with firm size, the percentage change in segment assets (%∆AT) and 
the percentage change in relative segment size (%∆RSS). If firms invest (versus divest), a 
positive correlation is consistent with firms directing resources toward efficient uses.  
I assign the DROP variable a value of one when a segment has relatively low 
industry-adjusted ROA compared to the weighted average of the firm’s remaining 
segments, and the segment is in a nongrowing industry. An efficient resource reallocation 




operations that are underperforming the firm’s other operations in an industry that is 
nongrowing. In other words, DROP = 1 when it is proactively efficient to reduce 
resources directed toward these operations, and zero otherwise. Therefore, holding all 
else equal, I expect DROP to be negatively correlated with firm size, the percentage 
change in segment assets (%∆AT) and the percent change in relative segment size 
(%∆RSS). Finally, the construction of KEEP and DROP gives rise to an expected 
negative correlation between the two variables.  
 
 
Empirical Proxies for the Degree of Resource Reallocation 
I estimate changes in the resource allocation decisions of firms in two ways. First 
is the annual percentage change in total assets allocated to each segment (%∆AT).  
Second, to capture a different dimension of resource reallocations within firms, I 
incorporate a scaled version of the above variable, i.e., the annual percentage change in 
relative segment size (%∆RSS).  %∆RSS captures changes in the importance of a 
segment to the firm, where importance is measured as the proportion of segment size to 




I include a number of firm- and segment-level variables in my regression models 
to control for other factors that might explain resource reallocations. Prior research shows 
that firms are more willing to both invest and reverse investment when there is a liquid 
market for the firm’s assets (Schlingemann, Stulz & Walkling, 2002). I control for the 




coefficient. I interact the liquidity term with DROP to control for the possibility that 
firms are less able to dispose of illiquid assets. I expect a positive coefficient on this 
interaction term. 
Prior research shows that leverage is negatively related to growth at both a firm 
and segment level (Lang, Ofek & Stulz, 1996). This implies a negative relationship with 
KEEP as well as %∆AT and %∆RSS. For poorly performing firms, however, higher 
leverage increases the speed at which firms react to poor performance (Jensen, 1986). 
This suggests a positive relationship with DROP, as divisions assigned an affirmative 
DROP are, by definition, performing poorly relative to the firm’s other divisions. I 
control for leverage via the LEV variable, but do not make a prediction for the sign of the 
coefficient. 
Financing constraints play an important role in firm investment decisions (e.g., 
Baker, Stein & Wurgler, 2003; Billett & Mauer, 2003). In an insightful new working 
paper, Kuppuswarmy and Villalonga (2010) use the 2008-2009 financial crisis as a 
natural experiment to examine the impact that external financing constraints have on 
changes in the value of diversified versus single-segment firms. They find strong 
evidence of a positive effect of diversification on firm value during a period of financial 
constraints. The authors attribute the incremental increase in multisegment firm value to a 
greater ease of access to funds and, under the crisis circumstances, an increase in the 
efficiency of internal versus external capital markets. 
I control for financing constraints with a measure of firm-level cash flow 
(FIRMCF). Greater cash flow implies fewer financial constraints; however, positive firm-




addition, prior studies point to inefficient over-investment when firms have excess free 
cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Richardson, 2006).  Accordingly, I do not make a prediction of 
the sign of the coefficient on FIRMCF. 
Highly levered or severely cash constrained firms may be forced to dispose of 
assets in relatively profitable segments to meet debt obligations. To capture this 
possibility, I include two interaction terms: KEEP * LEV and KEEP * FIRMCF. I expect 
the coefficient on the interaction with leverage to be negative, and the coefficient on the 
interaction with firm cash flow to be positive.   
I include a measure of the change in the level of firms’ external financing 
(∆_XFIN). Controlling for external financing allows the model specifications to better 
capture the degree of internal financing that occurs in multisegment firms, a major aspect 
of this study. As noted earlier, approximately 75% of funding for investment activity is 
generated within the firm (MacKie-Mason, 1990); nevertheless, changes in firms’ 
external financing are expected to influence investment behavior. As described above 
with FIRMCF, the actual funds procured by the firm, regardless of their source, 
theoretically should not influence efficient segment-level investment. Therefore, I do not 
make a prediction on the sign of the coefficient of the change in the level of external 
financing variable.  
The regression models include the natural logarithm of MVE (LN MVE) to 
control for firm size. I expect size to be positively related to the probability of an active 
internal capital market, or opportunities for cross-subsidization. I also include the number 
of operating segments (SEGN), which provides information on the firm’s degree of 




segments will necessarily change the proportion of assets allocated to each segment. 
Therefore, SEGN also controls for any mechanical influence when the dependent variable 
represents change in relative segment size (i.e., %∆RSS).  
I control for segment investment opportunities with an industry measure of 
Tobin’s q calculated using single-segment firms and assigned to segments based on three-
digit NAICS codes (SEGQ). In general, I expect investment to rise with growth 
opportunities. However, studies show that, compared to single-segment firms, q is less 
sensitive to investment in multisegment firms (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). Prior studies 
have used this result as evidence of inefficient resource reallocation, although subsequent 
research questions the use of single-segment firms as an appropriate benchmark 
(Chevalier, 2000).11 This study examines only multisegment firms, and without 
incorporating single-segment firms as a benchmark for efficiency, I expect a positive 
coefficient on SEGQ.  
I include the market-to-book equity ratio (MB) as an estimate of firm-level 
growth opportunities. Like the expectations for segment-growth opportunities above, in 
general, I expect changes in investment to parallel growth opportunities and therefore 
predict a positive coefficient on MB. An estimate of segment cash flow (SEGCF) serves 
to control for mechanical changes in segment assets due to results of operations. SEGCF 
is calculated as segment operating profit plus segment depreciation, all scaled by segment 
assets.  
                                                 
11The use of single-segment firms as a benchmark for determining the efficiency of conglomerate firms has 
a theoretical basis described in Coase (1937). Whether a task is optimally organized as a solo venture or 
resides within a larger organization is a result of a cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, studies aggregate the 
results of single-segment, different-industries firms so as to mirror the operations of conglomerate firms. 




Finally, the model includes fixed effects for year and industry due to the pooled, 
time-series, cross-sectional nature of the data. I report t-statistics based on robust standard 
errors clustered at the firm level following Petersen (2009).12                                 
 
 
Corporate Governance and Efficiency 
My second hypothesis predicts that the efficiency of resource reallocation varies 
with firms’ governance characteristics. Boards of directors are an important governance 
mechanism for monitoring the decisions of CEOs. Weisbach (1988) finds that board 
independence is the primary factor influencing the degree of board effectiveness in 
representing shareholder interests. Additionally, the presence of an independent board has 
also been shown in prior literature to be negatively related to proxies for earnings 
management (Klein, 2002) and the probability of financial fraud (Beasley, 1996). The 
authors of both these studies attribute their results to improved monitoring when boards 
are more independent. Also, as noted previously, in 2002 the SEC initiated new rulings 
which tightened board independence requirements specifically in order to enhance board 
monitoring effectiveness.13 
I expect additional monitoring, proxied for by a higher percentage of board of 
director independence, to accentuate the efficient reallocation of resources. To test this 
hypothesis, I examine firm responsiveness to the DROP classification. I assign a DROP 
variable equal to one when a segment’s time t-1 ROA is less than the weighted average 
ROA of the firm’s remaining segments and the segment is in a nongrowing industry. I 
                                                 
12Results and inferences do not change when standard errors are corrected for using two-way clustering.  
13See SEC ruling “NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance,” in 





expect firms with more independent boards to act more quickly and divest or reduce 
resources to divisions where DROP = 1 than do boards with a greater percentage of 
affiliated members.    
I partition my sample into increasing quintiles sorted by industry and year based 
on the percentage of the board of directors that, aside from holding a director role, is not 
affiliated with the firm. Employees, including the CEO, ex-employees and legal 
representation, are examples of firm affiliations that are not considered independent. 
Next, I identify the number of DROPs for each segment over a 4-year period, 
specifically, time t-3 through time t. Recurring DROPs suggest that the firm is 
maintaining operations in an inefficient segment. I anticipate that the monitoring 
activities of a more independent board result in the elimination of inefficient segments 
more quickly than the monitoring of a more dependent board which might be more 
aligned with the CEO.  
To examine the impact of an independent board of directors on the firm’s 




DROPSUMijt = γ0 + γ1INDEPjt + γ2 SEGLIQijt + γ3LEVjt-1 + γ4LN (MVE) jt + γ5MBjt    
    + γ6FIRMCFjt + γ7∆X_FINjt + γ8SEGQijt + γ9SEGNjt + γ10SEGCFijt  




DROPSUMijt = the number of DROPs assigned to segment i of firm j over the 
four-year period t-3 through t. A DROP is assigned a value of one 




ROA of the firm’s remaining segments and the segment is in a 
nongrowing industry, and zero otherwise. 
 
INDEPjt = increasing quintiles of the variable PCT_IND sorted by industry 
and year where PCT_IND equals the percent of independent board 
of directors of firm j at time t. Therefore, firms with a greater 
percentage of board independence are assigned to higher quintiles. 
 
    
The remaining variables are control variables previously defined with equation (1) 
and are also defined in Appendix A. I calculate robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
 INDEPjt is the variable of interest. An increase in the dependent variable implies 
less resource reallocation responsiveness, or that firms maintain inefficient segments for a 
longer time period. The governance variable quintiles are increasing in board 
independence; therefore, a negative and significant coefficient on INDEPjt (γ1) supports 
the hypothesis that governance characteristics vary with efficient resource reallocation. 
 As the liquidity or the ability to dispose of segment assets increases, the 
incentives to retain resources in underperforming segments diminish. Therefore, I expect 




       
      








SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 
I obtain segment-level and firm-level information from Compustat segment files 
and Compustat industry files for the years 1998 through 2008. A change in segment 
reporting regulation became effective for fiscal year-ends beginning after December 15, 
1997. A line of research, discussed in greater detail in the limitations section, points to 
substantial improvements in numerous aspects of segment-reporting disclosure under the 
new regulation, SFAS No. 131 (e.g., Botosan, McMahon & Stanford, 2010; Botosan & 
Stanford, 2005). Additionally, Hyland and Diltz (2002) conclude that studies examining 
the impact of firms’ internal capital markets using segment data under the prior 
regulation (i.e., SFAS No.14) are subject to potential reporting biases. Therefore, I use 
1998 as a starting point to ensure that the sample observations are reported under the 
current segment-reporting regime.  
  I retain firms with sufficient data to calculate firm- and segment-level control 
variables that report at least two business segments after a screen for noneconomically 
meaningful segments. Noneconomically meaningful segments often represent 
intercompany transfers or corporate eliminations. These include segments with a 
Compustat segment identification number (SID) of 99, or a segment name of 




remaining observations and remove segment observations with unclassified operations 
and segments with negative sales or assets, as these also tend to represent intercompany 
transfers or eliminations. The above screening results in a preliminary sample of 6,138 
multisegment firms. 
 Additionally, to ensure that the segments reported substantially reflect aggregate 
firm operations, I follow Berger and Ofek’s (1995) convention and require the sum of the 
segment sales to be within 5% of total firm sales. This results in the elimination of 220 
firms. I also require the sum of segment assets to be within 25% of total firm assets, 
resulting in the elimination of 418 firms from the sample. Consistent with related 
literature, I remove foreign firms (Compustat FIC not equal to USA), firms in regulated 
industries (SIC between 4900-4999), and financial industries (SIC between 6000-6999) 
due to the noncomparability of financial ratios for these industries.  
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection criteria. The resulting sample consists of 
15,031 segment observations and 5,698 firm-year observations from 1,454 unique 
multisegment firms covering the period 1998-2008.  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for firm-year observations. Panel A reports 
firm-level summary statistics. The mean (median) number of segments is 2.91 (3.00). As 
expected, because all firms report multiple segments, sample firms are fairly large, with 
average sales just over $2,852M and average assets of $3,420M. Sample firms are 
profitable with a mean (median) operating income of $237M ($37) and ROA of 0.06 
(0.08). Consistent with related studies covering a similar time period, the mean (median) 




Panel B in Table 2 reports segment-level summary statistics. The mean (median) 
percent change in total assets allocated to segments, one proxy for resource reallocations, 
is 0.05 (0.02) while the mean (median) percent change in relative segment size is -0.01   
(-0.01). Thirty-eight percent of the sample segments receive a KEEP designation (i.e., the 
segment’s relative ROA is greater than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s 
remaining segments, and the segment is in a nondeclining industry), while 23% of 
segments are designated as DROPs. The remaining 41% of the sample segments do not 
allow for an unambiguous KEEP or DROP designation. The mean (median) DROPSUM 
or number of DROPs assigned to a segment over a consecutive 4-year period is 2.40 
(2.00).  
Panel C in Table 2 provides a breakdown of the number of segments for firm-year 
observations. Approximately three-fourths of total firm-year observations report two or 
three segments, while 97% of the firm-year observations report less than six segments. 
Therefore the results of my analysis are unlikely to be driven by conglomerate firms with 
a large number of segments; rather, the sample appears to reflect firms reallocating 
resources across two to four segments. Table 3 presents Pearson and Spearman 
correlations for the primary variables used in regression models. As expected, KEEP and 
DROP are highly negatively and significantly correlated at -0.43. Also as anticipated, 
KEEP (DROP) is positively (negatively) and significantly associated with the proxies for 
firms’ resource reallocations. Specifically, the association between KEEP (DROP) and 
the percentage change in segment assets (%∆AT) is 0.09 (-0.10). For the percentage 
change in relative segment size (%∆RSS), the correlation is slightly smaller at 0.05 (-




as expected. KEEP (DROP) is positively (negatively) and significantly associated with 
firm size at 0.05  
(-0.06). KEEP (DROP) is negatively (positively) correlated with LEV (-0.04 and 0.06). 
LEV is negatively and significantly correlated with %∆RSS, as expected (-0.02), but has 
no significant correlation with %∆AT. 
Leverage is positively and significantly correlated with the number of segments 
(SEGN) with a value of 0.13. This is consistent with Lewellen’s (1971) rationale that the 
conglomerate organization form increases firms’ debt capacity as the imperfect 
correlation of revenue streams within multisegment firms reduces risk to debt holders.  
The change in external financing (∆_XFIN) is negatively and significantly 
associated with firm size (-0.15) and firm cash flow (-0.32), suggesting, somewhat 
intuitively, that firms with greater size and cash flow may have greater opportunity to 
rely more on internal capital markets in place of external financing. Additionally, the 
negative and significant correlation between ∆_XFIN and SEGN, at -0.04, suggests that 
as the number of firms’ segments increases, the existence of an internal capital market 
allows for a reduction in the reliance on external financing. 
 Finally, a 0.11 positive and significant association between the percentage of 
independent board members (PCT_IND) and SEGN is consistent with prior literature that 
suggests increases in complexity are met with stronger corporate governance mechanisms 
(Bushman et al., 2004).  
Table 4 reports a frequency matrix of DROPSUM and PCT_IND. These are the 
primary variables used to examine the impact of an independent board of directors on the 




represents the number of consecutive DROPs assigned to a segment over a 4-year period. 
For example, a DROPSUM of 2 is assigned when my ex ante prediction of DROP is 
assigned to a particular segment in 2 consecutive years. A prediction of DROP is 
assigned when the segment fails to show a within-firm comparative advantage; therefore, 
consecutive DROPs indicate that the firm fails to act in accordance with my predictions 
of efficient resource reallocation. PCT_IND represents increasing quintiles of the 
percentage of independent boards of directors. I conjecture that the responsiveness of 
boards of directors to reducing resources to inefficient operations is increasing with board 
independence. 
 The general distribution appears symmetric, with no particular governance 
quintile overrepresented; the smallest percentage of observations is in quintile 2 with 
18.2%, and the largest is quintile 4 with 24.15%. DROPSUMs of 1 and 4 are the most 
populated, with approximately 30% of observations in each category. DROPSUMs of 2 
represent 23% of observations, and DROPSUMs equal to 3 account for 17% of 
observations. Table 2 reports an average DROPSUM of 2.49. 
Firms in the lowest governance quintile, Q1, report the highest number of 
DROPSUMs equal to 4 (71 observations), while the Q1 firms drop segments designated 
inefficient within one year in 51 instances. Firms in the highest governance quintile, Q4, 
drop segments designated inefficient within one year in 71 instances, and report 69 



















Initial segment file data collection    169,120 
Less: Corporate eliminations     23,977 
          Segments with no operations       1,422 
          Segments with negative assets          194 
Economically meaningful segments 81,918 15,930 143,527 
Less:  Single-segment firms 50,600   9,792   50,600 
    
Multisegment firms  31,318   6,138   92,927 
Less:    
          Insufficient data                                             14,005   2,747   40,173 
          Financial industry firms   3,985     608   12,610 
          Regulated firms   1,706     201     5,502 
          Foreign firms   4,298    490   14,798 
Less firms with total segment sales    
         Outside 5% of firm sales     529    220     1,600 
         Outside 25% of firm assets   1,097    418     3,213 
Sample Observations    5,698 1,454   15,031 
This table summarizes the sample selection criteria for observations used in this 
study. Data are from Compustat segment and annual files. The sample includes the 


























Descriptive Statistics for Multisegment Firm-Years 
 
Panel A: Firm-Level Summary Statistics 
N = 5,698      
Variable Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev 
SEGN  2.91 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.08 
OIAD 237 37 2.75 154 660 
SALES(MM) 2,852 569 120 1,993 8,620 
ASSETS(MM) 3,420 557 116 1,876 19,689 
ROA 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.12 0.12 
LEV 0.58 0.38 0.05 0.83 1.39 
MVE 3,060 408 64 1,561 13,785 
MB 2.09 1.71 0.98 2.73 2.52 
FIRMCF 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.09 
ΔX_FIN 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.12 
PCT_IND 0.69 0.71 0.58 0.83 0.17 
      
Panel B: Segment-Level Summary Statistics 
N=15,031      
%∆AT 0.05 0.02 -0.07 0.15 0.37 
%∆RSS -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 0.09 0.28 
KEEP 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
DROP 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42 
SEGASSETS 1,014 149 27.40 602 5,838 
SEGLIQ 1.65 1.17 0.35 2.57 1.62 
SEGQ 1.67 1.52 1.21 1.95 0.62 
SEGCF 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.25 0.54 
DROPSUM 2.49 2.00 1.00 4.00 1.21 
      
Panel C:  Segment Frequency 
Firm-years with 2 segments 2,564    
Firm-years with 3 segments    1,846    
Firm-years with 4 segments 774    
Firm-years with 5 segments 335    
Firm-years with 6 or more 179    
Total 5,698    
This table provides descriptive statistics for multisegment firms over the period 1998-
2008.  Multisegment firms are those that report more than one segment in the Compustat 
segment file. Panel A presents firm-level summary statistics. SEGN is the number of 
segments reported based on unique segment identification numbers (SID) assigned by 
Compustat in the segment file. OIAD is operating income after depreciation. SALES 




Table 2 continued 
 
as income after depreciation, scaled by total assets. LEV is the debt-to-equity ratio 
computed as long-term debt, scaled by common equity. MVE is market value of equity, 
calculated as annual fiscal year-end closing price x common shares outstanding. MB is 
market-to-book equity ratio, calculated as MVE/common equity. FIRMCF is a measure 
of firms’ cash flow measured as operating activities-net cash flow less cash dividends, 
scaled by average assets. ∆X_FIN represents the net amount of cash flow from external 
financing sources calculated as net change in equity plus the net change in debt, scaled  
by average assets. The change in equity is the net cash received form the sale (and/or 
purchase) of common and preferred stock less cash dividends paid (Compustat SSTK - 
PRSTKC - DV), and the net change in debt equals net cash received form the issuance 
(or reduction) of debt (Compustat DLTIS –DLTR + DLCCH). PCT_IND is an estimate 
of the percentage of the board of directors that is independent (i.e., not affiliated with the 
firm). Panel B presents summary statistics on a segment level. %∆AT is the percentage 
change in segment assets calculated as the difference between current and lagged 
segment assets, divided by lagged assets. %∆RSS is the percentage change from prior 
year in relative segment size where relative segment size is calculated as segment assets 
over firm assets. KEEP is an indicator variable set to one when a segment has a high 
relative ROA and is in a nondeclining industry, and zero otherwise. See Chapter 4 in the 
text for a more detailed description of the variable. DROP is an indicator variable set to 
one when a segment has a low relative ROA and is in a nongrowth industry, and zero 
otherwise. See Chapter 4 in the text for a more detailed description of the variable. 
SEGASSETS equals segment assets. SEGLIQ is a measure of asset liquidity measured as 
the industry median of the sum of total current assets less total current liabilities, all 
divided by property, plant and equipment. Industry is defined using three-digit NAICS. 
SEGQ is a measure of segment growth opportunities calculated as median industry q of 
single segment firms in the same three-digit NAICS code where q is calculated as the 
market-to-book assets ratio (Compustat (AT - CEQ + (PRCC_F *CSHO))/average 
assets). SEGCF is segment cash flow measured as segment operating profit plus 
depreciation, scaled by segment assets. DROPSUM is the number of DROPs assigned to 


















Pearson and Spearman Correlations 
 
 %ΔAT % 
ΔRSS 






























































































































































































































































































































































.24     
(.0001) 
.34     
(.0001) 











Table 3 continued 
 %ΔAT % 
ΔRSS 









































This table presents Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations (p-values) for variables used in the 
regression analyses. There is a maximum of 15,031 segment firm-year observations over the period 1998-2008. See Table 2 or 













Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5  
(Hi) 
Total Percent 
1 51 87 74 64 71 347 29.51 
2 60 63 51 40 52 266 22.62 
3 38 46 31 43 43 201 17.09 
4 71 88 67 67 69 362 30.78 
Total 220 284 223 214 235 1,176 100.00 
Percent 18.71 24.15 18.96 18.20 19.98 100.00  
This table presents frequency distributions of DROPSUM, using the observations 
used to estimate equation (2). DROPSUM is the number of consecutive DROPs 
assigned to a segment over the 4-year period t-3 through t. PCT_IND represents 























Hypothesis 1 predicts that resource reallocation within firms is positively 
associated with efficiency. As discussed in Chapter 4, when a within-firm comparative 
advantage is detected for a segment, an efficient resource reallocation would add, or at 
least maintain (i.e., KEEP) the level of resources provided to that segment. Likewise, 
when a segment fails to exhibit a within-firm comparative advantage, an efficient 
reallocation reduces (i.e., DROPs) resources available to that segment. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the association between efficiency and firms’ resource 
reallocation varies with firms’ governance characteristics. My analysis examines firm 
responsiveness, that is, how quickly the firm moves toward abandoning operations in 
inefficient segments. In this section, I describe the results of tests of these hypotheses.  
 
 
Tests of Main Hypotheses 
 
Table 5 reports regression results of equation (1) where I examine whether 
changes in segment-level resource reallocations vary as expected with KEEP and DROP.  
In column 1, the dependent variable %∆AT captures the gross change in assets 




the importance of a segment to the firm, where importance is measured as the proportion 
of segment size to overall firm size.  
As expected, the estimates for the coefficients on the first of two variables of 
interest, KEEP, are positive and significant in both specifications. α1 equals 0.023 with a 
t-statistic of 2.08 when the dependent variable is %∆AT, and α1 has a coefficient of 0.024 
with a t-statistic of 2.66 with %∆RSS as the dependent variable. These results suggest 
that firms tend to increase resources to segments with a within-firm comparative 
advantage.   
Also as predicted, the coefficients on DROP, the second variable of interest, are 
negative and significant in both model specifications. With %∆AT as the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on α2 is -0.043 with a t-statistic of -4.04. With %∆RSS as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient on α2 is -0.028 with a t-statistic of -3.12. These 
suggest that firms reduce or abandon operations in divisions that lack a within-firm 
comparative advantage. The findings on KEEP and DROP provide support for H1 that, 
on average, firms efficiently reallocate resources across divisions.  
The signs on statistically significant control variables are generally as expected. 
For example, the firm level proxy for size (LN(MVE)), and the proxy for segment-level 
performance (SEGCF) are positive under both specifications. Larger firms are expected 
to have more active internal capital markets and, holding all else equal, better performing 
segments mechanically receive additional resources. 
For the dependent variable %∆AT, the magnitude of the coefficient on DROP     
(-0.043) is almost twice that of KEEP (0.023), while both have reasonably important 




assets suggests that dropping an inefficient segment reduces assets in that segment by an 
average of approximately $6M, while increases to efficient operations average 
approximately $3M.  
Table 6 reports the results of regression equation (2) where I examine the impact 
of corporate governance on firms’ responsiveness in abandoning operations in inefficient 
segments.  
The dependent variable, DROPSUM, represents the number of a segment’s 
DROPs over a 4-year period. Thus, the variable ranges from 1 to 4, with 4 representing 
firms with the least responsiveness or willingness to abandon operations in segments 
lacking a within-firm comparative advantage.   
INDEP represents increasing quintiles of the percentage of independent board 
members. Therefore, the higher quintiles contain firms with more independent boards. 
The regression coefficient on INDEP is negative (-0.053) and statistically significant at 
the 5% level, using a two-tailed test. I interpret this finding as evidence that firms with 
more independent boards more quickly reallocate resources away from segments with 
lower within-firm comparative advantages than do firms with more affiliated or 
dependent boards. This result is consistent with H2, which predicts that the positive 
association between efficiency and firms’ resource reallocation decisions varies with 
governance mechanisms. 
Predicted signs for control variables are generally as expected. A highly 
statistically significant, negative coefficient of -3.73 on SEGCF (t-statistic of -16.79) 
indicates that the more cash-producing segments are not likely dropped. The positive and 




more liquid or marketable assets can be more readily dropped when the segment is 
underperforming relative to the firm’s other operations.   
 
 
Construct Validity Test: Future Performance Analysis 
To test the validity of the KEEP and DROP variables, I examine the future 
earnings performance of sample firms. As previously described, KEEP is the ex ante 
prediction that firms maintain or increase resources to a segment. The counterpart to 
KEEP is DROP, the ex ante prediction that firms drop or reduce resources to a segment.  
I assume that multisegment firms invest strategically across their divisions to 
enhance overall firm profitability. Therefore, if KEEP (DROP) adequately reflects 
situations where it is advantageous for the firm to add (relinquish) resources to (from) a 
segment, firms with managers that reallocate resources in accordance with the KEEP and 
DROP predictions should outperform firms where managers do not do so. To test this 
prediction, I partition my sample into firms whose subsequent resource reallocations are 
in accordance with my ex ante predictions and firms whose subsequent resource 
reallocations are not in accordance with my ex ante predictions. In stacked regression 
analyses, I then compare the future performance of the two sets of firms. Next, I describe 
the tests in more detail and provide descriptive statistics and test results. 
In this analysis, I examine changes in resource allocation for time periods t+1 
through t+3 and examine: first, whether the adjusted percentage of resources allocated to 
a particular segment increases (decreases) in the year subsequent to the KEEP (DROP) 




assets over total firm assets, increases (decreases) in the year subsequent to the KEEP 
(DROP) designation. 
KEEP and DROP are assigned on a segment level; therefore, to examine firm-
level performance measures I construct two variables that aggregate the amount of 
resources reallocated to segments in accordance with predictions. First, I assign a firm-
level F_DOES indicator variable equal to one when at least half of firms’ segment 
resource reallocation decisions agree with my ex ante predictions, and a zero otherwise. 
Next I use the continuous variable PCTGOOD to indicate the percentage of firm 
segments that received or were relieved of resources according to predictions. I estimate 
the following regression models:  
 
EARN_PERFjt+n = β0 + β1F_DOESjt + β2EARN_PERFjt + β3 LN (MVE) jt  
                              + β3 OIAD_LOSS jt + εjt      (3) 
 
EARN_PERFjt+n = λ0 + λ1PCTGOODjt + λ2EARN_PERFjt + λ3 LN (MVE) jt  
                             + λ3 OIAD_LOSS jt + εjt      (4) 
 
Where: EARN_PERFjt+n is one of five dependent variables representing future earnings 
performance of firm j measured at of one of the 3 subsequent years, including: 
ROAjt+n = Return on Assets calculated as operating income scaled 
by total assets of firm j at time t+1, t+2 or t+3 (Compustat 
OIAD/AT). 
 
ROEjt+n = Return on Equity calculated as income after depreciation, 
scaled by beginning-of-year common equity of firm j at 





NI_ATjt+n = Net Income scaled by total assets of firm j at time t+1, 
t+2 or t+3 (Compustat NI/AT). 
 
OPEPSjt+n  = Earnings per Share from operations of firm j at time t+1, 
t+2 or t+3 (Compustat OPEPS). 
 
EPSjt+n = Earnings per Share (diluted) excluding extraordinary 
items of firm j at time t+1, t+2 or t+3 (Compustat EPSFX). 
 
Independent Variables of Interest: 
F_DOESjt = an indicator variable assigned a one when at least half of 
firm j’s segment-level resource reallocation decisions in 
time t+1 agree with my ex ante predictions of KEEP or 
DROP in time t, and zero otherwise. 
Or 
 
PCTGOODjt = the percent of a firm’s segments where the resource 
reallocations in time t+1 agree with ex ante predictions of 
KEEP or DROP in time t.  
 
Control Variables: 
EARN_PERFjt = the contemporaneous value of one of the five earnings              
                                                 performance measures described above. 
 
LN (MVE) jt  = the natural logarithm of the market value of equity of 
firm j at time t. The market value of equity is calculated as 
annual fiscal year-end closing price * common share 
outstanding (Compustat (PRCC_C * CSHO)/SEQ).  
 
OIAD_LOSSjt = an indicator variable set to one when firm-level operating 
income after depreciation (Compustat OIADP) is less than 
zero, and zero otherwise. 
 
In equation (3), F_DOES14 is the variable of interest, and in equation (4), 
PCTGOOD is the variable of interest. A positive and significant coefficient on β1 in 
equation (3) and λ1 in equation (4) indicates that firms making a majority of segment 
                                                 




resource reallocation decisions that agree with predictions experience significant 
improvements in future firm-level profitability relative to firms where the majority of 
resource reallocation decisions did not agree with predictions. 
Table 7 reports annual observations of firms where resource reallocations match 
(do not match) the predictions of KEEP (DROP). Panel A presents observations when the 
match (fail to match) determination is made using the adjusted percentage of resources 
reallocated to a segment (%∆ADJAT). In this analysis, the annual percentage change in 
assets of a segment (%∆AT) is adjusted by removing the impact of the segment’s results 
of operations. Panel B contains observations using the previously defined percent change 
in relative segment size (%∆RSS).  
In Panel A, of the total of 7,786 firm-year observations, 66% (5,138) of firms’ 
actions match the KEEP (DROP) prediction, while 34% (2,648) of firms’ resource 
reallocations do not match predictions. In general, the percentage of matches tends to 
increase slightly each year over the 10-year period, with 2006 showing the highest 
percentage of predictions matching actual (73%). In the sample, the fewest matches occur 
during 1999, where 477 (52%) firm-years were correctly predicted and 439 (48%) of 
firm-year observations did not match predictions. This is potentially due to the change in 
segment-reporting regulation which took effect for year-ends after December 15, 1997. If 
firms were slow to adopt SFAS No. 131, lower-quality segment-reporting might impact 
the early years of this analysis. 
Panel B reports a tighter range of predictions, matching actual actions over the 
sample years. The matching rate falls between 62% and 67% in all years. Additionally, 




although the trend is not as evident as that seen in Panel A. Overall, Panel B results 
parallel those of Panel A, with an average of 64% of firm resource reallocations matching 
predictions. 
To add insight on the types of firms or industries where resource reallocations 
match predictions, and to ensure that no one industry is driving results, Table 8 presents 
firms’ resource reallocation decisions by industry sector (Panel A) and industry lifecycle 
stage (Panel B).   
 Panel A illustrates that my predictions are most accurate in the insurance sector, 
where 90% of firm resource reallocations match predictions using %∆ADJAT. However, 
the number of industry observations, 21, is small. Resource reallocations in the 
construction sector also reflect a high degree of predictability. The percentage of matches 
totals 71% (72%) using %∆ADJAT (%∆RSS). Although no sectors fall below a 50% 
matching rate, my methodology generates the lowest percentage of matches in the real 
estate (50%), other services (52%), and educational (59%) sectors using %∆ADJAT. 
 Overall, Panel A depicts a reasonable distribution among industry sectors. One or 
two sectors do not appear to be responsible for an overwhelming percentage of matches 
between actual firm resource reallocations and my ex ante predictions thereof. 
 Panel C presents the breakdown of successful and unsuccessful predictions into 
the industry lifecycle stages used in this study (Growth, Technological Change, 
Consolidation and Decline).15 The percentage of matching predictions varies little across 
the four lifecycle stages (between a 64% and 68% matching percentage using %∆ADJAT 
                                                 




and between 64% and 66% using %∆RSS). It does not appear that matching predictions 
of resource reallocations are clustered in any one industry lifecycle stage.  
 Table 9 presents the results of a univariate comparison of firm characteristics and 
future performance measures for firms where resource reallocation decisions match 
actual predictions (F_DOES = 1) to firms where the predictions do not match firm 
decisions (F_DOES = 0). 
 Panel A presents mean and median firm characteristics. The mean values for the 
number of segments, firm size, market-to-book ratio, firm leverage, and external 
financing constraints are not statistically different between firms where resource 
reallocations match and do not match predictions. At the median, firms that match 
predictions are significantly larger (z-statistic of 5.29) and have a higher market-to-book 
ratio (z-statistic of 2.19).  
 Panels B through D show five different future performance measures: ROA, 
ROE, NI_AT, OPEPS, and EPS. Panel B presents these measures in time t+1 where time 
t represents the KEEP or DROP designation. Both the mean and median performance 
measures are significantly different between the two subsamples. In all instances, the 
firm-years where firm resource reallocations match predictions significantly outperform 
firms whose actions do not match predictions. 
Panel C reports results at the time period t+2. Firms reallocating resources 
according to predictions continue to outperform firms that do not, although the strength 
of the differences deteriorates relative to time t+1 (i.e., the test statistics drop in 
magnitude for each performance measure in time t+2). Additionally, the mean ROE is no 




Panel D again shows weakening of the differences in performance measures 
between the two groups at time period t+3. Tests statistics drop again in magnitude for all 
but one performance measure; however, the raw performance measures do not 
necessarily decline between the time periods. Mean values continue to show significant 
differences for four of the five performance measures (as above, mean ROE is not 
statistically different between the two groups), while median values of performance 
measures are significantly greater for three of the five performance measures for firms 
that reallocated resources according to predictions of KEEP and DROP.  
Overall, if efficient resource reallocations are rewarded with improved future 
performance, the univariate results are consistent with the KEEP and DROP designations 
reflecting efficiency. This provides support for the validity of my KEEP and DROP 
constructs. The subsample of firms whose actions match the predictions of KEEP and 
DROP post-earnings performance measures significantly larger than firms whose 
resource reallocations do not match the predictions. The multivariate tests described next 
supplement these results.  
 Table 10 reports the results of estimating regression equation (3). The dependent 
variable is one of five firm-level earnings performance variables, each calculated over 
three time periods, t+1, t+2 and t+3, where time t reflects the designation of KEEP or 
DROP to a segment. The five performance variables are ROA, ROE, NI_AT, OPEPS and 
EPS. The variable of interest is the indicator variable, F_DOES (β2). F_DOES is set to 
one when at least half of the firm’s segment resource reallocation decisions agree with 
my ex ante predictions, and a zero otherwise. I calculate F_DOES in two ways: first. 




second, using the percentage change of relative segment size (%∆RSS). A positive and 
significant coefficient on β2 provides evidence consistent with efficient resource 
reallocation decisions positively contributing to firm-level future earnings performance.   
 In time period t+1, F_DOES calculated using %∆ADJAT is statistically 
significant in three of the five future performance specifications. In time period t+2, 
F_DOES is positive and significant in two of five specifications. When I calculate 
F_DOES using the %∆RSS, results are positive and significant for four of the five 
performance measures in time period t+2. For time period t+3, F_DOES is significant at 
the 10% level for only operating earnings per share (OPEPS).  
F_DOES is not significant in any of the model specifications using EPS as a 
dependent variable (Panel E). Among the dependent variables, EPS might have the 
lowest ability to reflect efficiency, as this variable incorporates one-time gains and losses 
and other special items potentially far removed from firms’ resource reallocation 
decisions. However, poor results might be more due to scaling, as net income scaled by 
total assets (NI_AT), likely a better indicator of efficiency, is statistically significant in 
three-fourths of time t+1 and t+2 model specifications.  
Table 11 presents the results of estimating regression equation (4). As in Table 
10, the dependent variable is one of five firm-level earnings performance variables, each 
calculated over three time periods, t+1, t+2 and t+3, where time t reflects the designation 
of a KEEP or DROP to a segment. The variable of interest is PCTGOOD (λ2).  
PCTGOOD reflects the percentage of a firm’s segment resource reallocation decisions 




PCTGOOD will positively contribute to future earnings performance; I therefore expect 
positive and significant coefficients on λ2. 
Although slightly weaker, results in Table 11 mirror those of Table 10. When 
PCTGOOD is calculated using %∆ADJAT, three of the five model specifications in time 
period t+1 report a positive and statistically significant coefficient on λ2. Results are 
insignificant under time periods t+2 and t+3.  
In both Tables 10 and 11, when the variable of interest is calculated using 
%∆RSS, results are strongest under time t+2. A delay in experiencing positive returns to 
investment is not unexpected, and more future time periods (i.e., t+3 and beyond) might 
be impacted by other events or circumstances. As in Table 10, Table 11 reports 
statistically significant coefficients at least at the 10% level, on the variable of interest in 
four of the five model specifications in time t+2.  
In general, I expect increases in the efficiency of resource reallocation within 
firms to manifest in improved future earnings performance. Although the evidence in the 
multivariate tests are not entirely uniform across all future performance measures tested, 
the combined results of this section’s analysis are consistent with more improved future 
earnings performance for firms that reallocate resources in accordance with KEEP and 
DROP predictions, relative to firms that do not reallocate resources according to KEEP 








Tests Using Only Segments in Growth and Decline Industries 
 In this section, I report results from estimating equations (1) and (2), using only 
observations with segments in the growth and decline industry lifecycle stages. Industry 
lifecycle stages are a component of KEEP and DROP, my proxies for efficient resource 
reallocation. Eliminating segments in the arguably indistinct ‘technological change’ and 
‘consolidation’ lifecycles stages reduces the sample by 2,239 observations or 
approximately 15%. 
In the main regression analysis previously reported, I use the technological 
change and consolidation industry lifecycle stage categories to arrive at “nongrowth” and 
“nondecline” classifications as one of two components of KEEP and DROP. The second 
component, the segments’ relative ROA, remains the same in this alternate analysis. To 
summarize, in this analysis, only segments in a growing industry with an industry-
adjusted ROA greater than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s remaining segments 
receive a KEEP designation. KEEP is an ex ante prediction that firms maintain or 
increase resources to the segment. DROP requires a segment to have an industry-adjusted 
ROA less than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s remaining segments and be in a 
declining industry.16 DROP is the ex ante prediction that firms reduce resources to a 
segment. 
Table 12 reports results from estimating regression equation (1), where I examine 
whether changes in segment-level resource reallocations vary as expected with KEEP and 
DROP. The predicted signs on all coefficient estimates remain the same as shown in the 
original estimation reported in Table 5. 
                                                 
16 See Appendix B for additional detail on the calculation of industry lifecycle stages. Appendix C presents 




The coefficients on KEEP and DROP, α1 and α2, maintain the predicted signs, 
although under the model specification using %∆AT as the dependent variable, KEEP is 
no longer statistically significant. The statistical significance for DROP, on the other 
hand, shows a slight improvement under both model specifications. 
Overall explanatory power of the model decreases slightly when the dependent 
variable is %∆AT; adjusted R2 in Table 12 is 11%, whereas Table 5 reports an adjusted 
R2 of 13%. Both Tables 5 and 12 report a 3% adjusted R2 when the dependent variable is 
measured using %∆RSS.   
Taken as a whole, the results of this analysis using a “cleaner” KEEP and DROP, 
which examines segments only in declining or growing industries, are consistent with 
results of Table 5 and provide additional support for H1. The significant and negative 
coefficients on DROP suggest that firms reduce resources to segments that lack a within-
firm comparative advantage. The results are mixed for the coefficient on KEEP, although 
they do suggest that firms increase, or at least maintain, resources provided to operations 
with a within-firm comparative advantage. 
 Table 13 presents regression results from estimating equation (2) using the 
“cleaner” versions of KEEP and DROP described above. Equation (2) examines the 
impact of corporate governance on firms’ responsiveness in reducing resources to 
inefficient segments. 
 The variable of interest, INDEP, represents increasing quintiles of the percentage 
of independent board members. DROPSUM, the dependent variable, represents the 
number of a segment’s consecutive DROP designations. The larger DROPSUM is, the 




segments. A negative and significant coefficient on INDEP would suggest that firms with 
more independent boards move more quickly to reallocate resources away from divisions 
that do not display a within-firm comparative advantage. 
 The elimination of segments in the technological change and consolidation 
industry lifecycles stages reduces the sample size by 814 observations or 31%. The 
smaller sample size reduces the power of the test and is potentially responsible for the 
loss of significant results. The coefficient on INDEP, although negative as predicted, 
lacks statistical significance, with a t-statistic of -1.50. The results of this test fail to 
provide additional support for H2, which examines whether the efficiency of within-firm 
resource reallocation varies with firms’ governance mechanisms.   
 
Tests Using Alternative Measures of Efficiency 
 This section examines the sensitivity of my results to alternative measures of 
internal capital market efficiency found in related literature. As noted in Chapter 2, the 
internal capital market efficiency literature generally investigates whether inefficiencies 
in internal capital markets of multisegment firms are at least partially responsible for 
differences in value between single and multisegment firms. For example, Billet and 
Mauer (2003; BM03) conclude that the existence of an internal capital market adds to 
firm value only when segments with good investment opportunities are unable to fund 
their own investments, that is, the authors identify financing constraints as a key 
determinant of the impact of an internal capital market on firm value. BM03 first estimate 
whether or not each segment within a firm provides funding to, or receives funding from, 




determines whether or not the transfer (when a segment provides resources to a peer 
segment) or subsidy (when the segment receives resources from another segment) is 
efficient. 
In this section, I follow BM03 and calculate the efficiency of both segment 
transfers and subsidies. Initially, I calculate the difference between a segment’s CAPX 
expenditures and its free cash flow17 to determine each segment’s ability to fund its own 
investment. When a segment’s capital expenditures exceed its free cash flow, segment 
operations alone do not sufficiently fund the segment’s CAPX, and the segment is 
determined to have received a subsidy.  
I calculate Excess CAPX = max [CAPX – (operating profits + depreciation), 0] 
for each segment. The purpose of the measure is to isolate contemporaneous across-
segment resource reallocations. To control for the possibility that CAPX funding arises 
from other sources, such as prior years’ retained cash flow or external funding, I follow 
BM03 and subtract a firm-level subsidy value from the segment-level subsidy; thus 
Subsidy = max [(Segment Excess CAPX – Firm Excess CAPX), 0]. 
Like the segment-level subsidy, the firm-level subsidy is measured by the 
shortfall between firm free cash flow and firm-level capital expenditures. This shortfall 
represents the portion of firm investment spending requiring one of the following: 
external funding, prior year’s retained cash flow, or the depletion of existing assets. The 
difference between the segment subsidy and the firm subsidy isolates the extent of 
transfers across segments within the firm. For example, when the segment subsidy is less 
than the firm subsidy, the entire segment subsidy could have come from the external 
                                                 
17Free cash flow is equal to the segment’s operating profit plus depreciation. Following Berger and Hann 
(2007), if segment depreciation is missing in Compustat segment files, it is set to equal zero. If segment 




sources of the firm subsidy. Alternatively, when the segment subsidy is greater that the 
firm subsidy, the difference is likely due to a transfer within the firm, that is, a resource 
reallocation among segments. 
Next, I define a segment’s potential transfer (p_transfer) as the excess of free cash 
flow less the segment’s CAPX.  However, the amount of resources transferred to peer 
segments is limited to the sum of segment subsidies. Therefore, each segment’s transfer 
is calculated as the minimum of the potential transfer and the segment’s weighted share 
of total firm subsidies. That is, Transfer = min [p_transfer,((p_transfer/Σ 
p_transfer)*Σ Subsidy)] where the summations are over all segments for each firm. 
BM03 define efficiency using relative ROA. In this study, BM03_EFFSUB 
(BM03_INEFFSUB) is an indicator variable set to one if the segment receiving the 
subsidy has a larger (smaller) ROA than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s 
remaining segments, and zero otherwise. Likewise, BM03_EFFTRF (BM03_INEFFTRF) 
is an indicator variable set to one if the segment providing the transfer has a smaller 
(larger) ROA than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s remaining segments. This 
methodology fails to consider segments in industries that might have superior growth 
opportunities but currently do not have superior returns, thereby potentially prematurely 
casting an “inefficient” designation on certain segment subsidies. Maksimovic and 
Phillips (2002) add another criticism of the measure by documenting that most of the 
growth in multisegment firms happens via acquisitions and not CAPX. 
Berger and Hann (2007; BH07) also follow the methodology of BM03 in a study 
that seeks to identify firms making inefficient cross-segment transfers of resources. BH07 




another segment. Unlike BM03’s use of relative ROA to determine efficiency, BH07 
define efficiency using relative return on sales (ROS). That is, segment subsidies are 
inefficient when the ROS of the segment receiving the subsidy is less than the weighted 
average ROS of the firm’s remaining segments. BH07 argue that sales are more likely 
than assets to be fully allocated to segments, and therefore ROS represents a better 
measure of relative segment performance than ROA. In this analysis, BH07_EFFSUB 
(BH07_INEFFSUB) is a segment-level indicator variable set to one if a segment 
receiving a subsidy has a ROS greater than (less than) the weighted average ROS of the 
firm’s remaining segments. BH07 do not evaluate transfers or situations where a 
segment’s free cash flow exceeds its CAPX and the segment can then act as a provider of 
funds to peer segments. 
Table 14 reports descriptive statistics on the alternative measures of efficiency. 
Panel A presents comparative measures for KEEP and DROP. By design, KEEP and 
DROP are measures of efficiency. This study classifies 10,673 KEEP segments and 4,712 
DROP segments. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the sample using the BM03 
measures. BM03 classifies a total of 11,767 segments as follows: 1,007 segments as 
efficient subsidies, 4,814 segments as inefficient subsidies, 668 segments as efficient 
transfers and 5,278 segments as inefficient transfers. Under the BM03 and BH07 
methodologies, segments classified as having neither a subsidy nor a transfer result 
receive efficiency classification for the segment.   
Efficient subsidies indicate segments worthy of additional resources; therefore, 
the KEEP and efficient subsidies measures are aligned. There are reasons to argue that 




subsidy measures. Transfers indicate that the segment is a provider of resources to peer 
segments. When a transfer is deemed inefficient, the efficient action would have been to 
refrain from transferring resources to peer segments; in other words, to keep the resources 
in the original segment. Panel B reflects this alignment as 61% of the BM03 efficient 
subsidies are also classified as KEEP segments and 61% of the BM03 inefficient 
transfers are assigned a KEEP designation.  
DROP is comparable to the efficient transfer measures (i.e., both suggest a 
reduction of resources) and the inefficient subsidy measures. Like DROP, an inefficient 
subsidy segment is not deemed worthy of receiving additional resources. Panel B reports 
that 66% of BM03 efficient transfers receive a DROP designation and 55% of the BM03 
inefficient subsidies receive a DROP designation. Additionally, Panel B shows that no 
segments are inconsistently categorized between KEEP, DROP and the BM03 measures. 
Specifically, no segments receive a DROP designation as well as an efficient subsidy or 
an inefficient transfer designation. Likewise, no segments simultaneously receive a KEEP 
designation as well as an efficient transfer or an inefficient subsidy designation. 
Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the sample using the BH07 measures. 
Using the BH07 methodology, 606 segments are classified as efficient subsidies and 
4,177 segments are classified as inefficient subsidies. The intent behind the development 
of the BH07 measures helps explain the disproportionate number of inefficient 
classifications. For example, to suit their research design, BH07 aim to identify a 
subsample of inefficient firms and calculate only inefficient actions by firms. Although 
this study does not presume that noninefficient actions are, in fact, efficient, the 




computation of inefficient subsidies. Therefore, as shown in Panel C, the disproportionate 
percentage of inefficient subsidies (34% inefficient subsidies as compared to 6% efficient 
subsidies) is not surprising.  
BM03, on the other hand, separately calculate inefficient and efficient subsidies 
and transfers. Yet inefficient actions seem disproportionately represented here as well. As 
reported in Panel B, approximately 43% of sample firms classify at least one segment as 
inefficient while only 10% of sample firms have at least one segment classified as 
efficient.  
Under the BH07 methodology, a small percentage of segments are inconsistently 
categorized relative to KEEP and DROP. For example, in Panel C, 34 segments, or 5% of 
the 606 segments, reported as efficient subsidy segments receive a DROP designation, 
and 16 segments, or 0.4% of the 4,177 inefficient subsidy segments, receive a KEEP 
designation. This inconsistency was not evident between the BM03 measures and KEEP 
and DROP, and is likely due to differences in the criteria used to determine efficiency. As 
noted previously, BH07 use segment ROS, while BM03, as well as KEEP and DROP, 
use segment ROA when determining efficiency.  
 Table 15 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the various efficiency 
measures used in this study. As noted above, KEEP reflects situations when it is efficient 
to retain or increase resources in a segment, and is comparable to the efficient subsidy 
measures BM03_EFFSUB and BH07_EFFSUB, and the inefficient transfer measure, 
BM03_INEFFTRF. The efficient subsidy variables reflect when it is efficient for a 
segment to receive subsidies from other segments or, in the case of the inefficient 




Even as these measures consider growth in a segment as efficient, the correlations 
between KEEP and the efficient subsidy measures are relatively low although statistically 
significant (0.09 between KEEP and BM03_EFFSUB, and 0.02 between KEEP and 
BH07_EFFSUB). The correlation between KEEP and BM03_INEFFTRF is 0.22 and 
statistically significant. 
Interestingly, a much stronger negative relationship exists between KEEP, the 
inverse of the two efficient subsidy measures. BM03_INEFFSUB and BH07_INEFFSUB 
are indicator variables set to one when it is inefficient to provide subsidies to a segment. 
The correlation between KEEP and BM03_INEFFSUB is -0.41, and the correlation 
between KEEP and BH07_INEFFSUB is -0.31; both are statistically significant.  
DROP, an indicator variable set to one when it is efficient to relinquish resources 
in a segment, might initially seem most aligned with the efficient transfer measure 
(BM03_EFFTRF). Again, transfer segments are providers of resources to peer segments. 
The significant correlation coefficient of 0.21 is, therefore, expected. However, the much 
larger correlation between DROP and the two inefficient subsidy measures (0.49 with 
BM03_INEFFSUB, and 0.41 with BH07_INEFFSUB) supports the argument that 
inefficient subsidy segments reflect situations where an efficient move would have been 
to refrain from or not provide additional resources to a segment, thus paralleling the 
intuition behind the DROP variable.  
The superior strength of the relationships of KEEP and DROP with the inefficient 
proxies, as opposed to the more straightforward interpretation of the efficiency proxies, 
likely reflects the disproportionate number of BM03 and BH07 inefficient segments 




I expect a high correlation between the BH07 and BM03 measures, as the BH07 
proxies closely follow the BM03 computations. The primary difference between the two 
is the use of relative ROS (BH07) versus relative ROA (BM03) when determining if a 
segment is outperforming other segments in the firm. The correlation between efficient 
subsidies per BM03 and BH07 is 0.59, and the correlation between inefficient subsidies 
is 0.77; both are statistically significant. 
 Table 16 reports regressions results of equation (1) where I examine whether 
changes in segment-level resource reallocations vary with the alternative measures of 
efficiency developed in this section. I substitute BM03_EFFSUB for KEEP and 
BM03_EFFTRF for DROP. In column 1, the dependent variable %∆AT captures the 
gross change in assets allocated to segments. In column 2, the dependent variable 
%∆RSS captures changes in the importance of a segment to the firm, where importance is 
measured as the proportion of segment size (i.e., segment assets) to overall firm size. 
Consistent with the results of Table 5, the estimates for the coefficients on 
BM03_EFFSUB, the substitute for KEEP in this analysis, are positive and significant in 
both specifications. α1 equals 0.133 with a t-statistic of 2.74 when the dependent variable 
is %∆AT, and α1 has a coefficient of 0.108 with a t-statistic of 3.11 with %∆RSS as the 
dependent variable. These results suggest that firms tend to increase resources to 
segments with a within-firm comparative advantage. Although the statistical significance 
is slightly stronger for the alternative measure than that reported for KEEP in Table 5, the 
overall explanatory power of the models decreases using the alternative BM03 measures. 




%∆AT (%∆RSS), while Table 5, using KEEP and DROP, reports adjusted R2s of 0.134 
(0.033).  
Results for the second variable of interest, BM03_EFFTRF, the substitute for 
DROP in this analysis, are also as predicted in both model specifications. With %∆AT as 
the dependent variable, the coefficient on α2 is -0.061 with a t-statistic of -2.48. With 
%∆RSS as the dependent variable, the coefficient on α2 is -0.054 with a t-statistic of  
-5.01, suggesting that firms reduce or abandon operations in divisions that lack a within-
firm comparative advantage. The findings using these alternative measures provide 
support for H1 that, on average, firms efficiently reallocate resources across divisions. 
Although inferences do not change, the statistical significance is slightly stronger for the 
alternative measure in one of the two model specifications than that reported for DROP in 
Table 5. 
With the exception of negative and significant coefficients for SEGCF in both 
model specifications, coefficients on control variables are consistent with Table 5 results.  
The primary difference between KEEP and DROP, the variables of interest in Table 5, 
and the corresponding BM03 measures reported in Table 16, is that KEEP and DROP 
incorporate industry lifecycle when determining efficiency. I use this difference to 
explain the unexpected change in sign on the coefficients for SEGCF in Table 16. 
Although the magnitude of the coefficient is small (-0.001 for both model specifications), 
the statistically significant t-statistics suggest that a decrease in segment cash flow is 
associated with an increase in resources allocated to that segment. This is a plausible 




The results also provide construct validity for the KEEP and DROP variables, as 
results using the BM03 alternative measures of efficiency provide consistent inferences 
on whether firms efficiently reallocate resources across divisions.   
 Table 17 presents the regressions results of equation (1), where I examine whether 
changes in segment-level resource reallocations vary with the alternative measures of 
efficiency developed in this section. I substitute BH07_EFFSUB in place of KEEP, and 
BH07_INEFFSUB in place of DROP.  In column 1, the dependent variable %∆AT 
captures the gross change in assets allocated to segments. In column 2, the dependent 
variable %∆RSS captures changes in the importance of a segment to the firm, where 
importance is measured as the proportion of segment size to overall firm size. 
Consistent with the results of Table 5, the estimates for the coefficients on 
BH07_EFFSUB, the substitute for KEEP in this analysis, are positive and significant in 
both specifications. α1 equals 0.037 with a t-statistic of 4.14 when the dependent variable 
is %∆AT, and α1 has a coefficient of 0.022 with a t-statistic of 4.68 with %∆RSS as the 
dependent variable. These results suggest that firms tend to increase resources to 
segments with a within-firm comparative advantage. The statistical significance is again 
slightly stronger for the alternative measure than that reported for KEEP in Table 5. 
 Results for the second variable of interest, BH07_INEFFSUB, the substitute for 
DROP in this analysis, are not consistent with my prediction in either model 
specification. With %∆AT as the dependent variable, the coefficient on α2 is 0.00 with a 
t-statistic of 0.07, and with %∆RSS as the dependent variable, the coefficient on α2 is 




Untabulated results using a third combination of alternative variables, 
BM03_EFFSUB for KEEP and BM03_INEFFSUB for DROP, generate results similar to 
those reported in Table 17. Results are as expected for the KEEP alternative 
(BM03_EFFSUB) but insignificant for the DROP alternative (BM03_INEFFSUB) for 
both model specifications.  
 
 
Limitations and Alternative Explanations 
Types of Inefficiencies 
 
The goal of this paper is to examine one aspect of managers’ investment 
decisions: the efficiency of resource reallocation across segments. Therefore, my research 
design might fail to detect other types of inefficiencies in investment decisions. For 
example, I do not test whether firms fund all and/or only projects with positive net 
present values. Additionally, my tests do not detect potential over-investment in divisions 
with the greatest within-firm comparative advantage. Prior studies examine this specific 
issue at the firm level. For example, Richardson (2006) finds a positive association 
between firm-level over-investment and firms’ free cash flow.  
Finally, the within-firm nature of my study precludes me from commenting on the 
efficiency of managers’ resource reallocation decisions in the context of the entirety of 
the investment opportunity set available to managers or investors, which could include 









I examine the impact of one relevant corporate governance mechanism on the 
efficiency of within-firm resource reallocation. Corporate governance can be viewed 
more broadly and as consisting of a governance structure where numerous governance 
mechanisms act in an interdependent manner.  
 
Use of Segment Data  
The managerial discretion permitted in segment reporting potentially leads to 
reporting biases. On the one hand, permitted discretion is necessary as segment reporting 
under the managerial approach strives to provide users of financial information insight 
into how management delineates activities for purposes such as reviewing earnings and 
making resource reallocation decisions. On the other hand, disclosure costs can provide 
incentives for managers to underreport, or otherwise obscure the scope of operations 
presented in the segment footnote (Berger & Hann, 2007; Botosan & Stanford, 2005; 
Harris, 1998). Although the potential to distort segment reporting is problematic, a 1997 
change in segment-reporting regulation has implications for my study. As described 
below, the regulation change improved the quality of segment data. This improvement 
lessens the potential impact of a bias relative to studies undertaken using segment data 
under the previous regulation, while at the same time reduces comparability to similar 
studies.  
Prior studies examining the efficiency of internal capital markets (e.g., Rajan et 




SFAS No. 14.18 Hyland and Diltz (2002) document that only 72% of reported segment 
changes under SFAS No. 14 reflected actual changes in the composition of firms’ 
operations, as documented in the management discussion and analysis. These and other 
concerns about the reliability of segment data under SFAS No. 14 led to the improved 
segment-reporting requirements of SFAS No. 131.19 Subsequent research concludes that 
the quality and quantity of information contained in segment disclosures is markedly 
improved under SFAS No. 131. Firms report more segments and more relevant 
information about each segment under the new regulation (Berger & Hann, 2003; 
Herrmann & Thomas, 2000; Street, Nichols & Gray, 2000). Under SFAS No. 131, firms 
also report segment information that more closely reflects their internal organizational 
design (Botosan et al., 2010), and provide more information about data used to guide 
managers’ investment decisions, specifically, divisional profitability and growth 
opportunities (Chen & Zhang, 2003; Ettredge, Kwon, Smith & Stone, 2006). As noted 
earlier, my efficiency measures incorporate these two segment characteristics. 
Even so, it may not be the case that managerial incentives changed with the 
segment-reporting requirements. Therefore, that firms are now required to disclose more 
detailed segment information in no way guarantees that managers completely and 
adequately allocate firm assets, revenues and expenses to individual segments, or refrain 
from engaging in strategic transfer pricing on within-firm transactions. If managers have 
incentives to use such latitude to hide poorly performing segments (due to agency costs) 
or segments with superior performance (due to proprietary costs), I expect this constrains 
                                                 
18A small number of related studies use alternative datasets, such as plant-level data for manufacturing 
firms that are subject to their own limitations, including data availability and generalizability (e.g., 
Maksimovic & Phillips, 2002; Schoar, 2002; Villalonga, 2004b). 




my ability to properly categorize such firms, thereby working against my ability to 
document statistically significant results. Nonetheless, my results and inferences reflect 
both managerial action and, to a degree, potential bias in segment reporting. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
For a number of reasons, firms might change the degree of investment in 
segments that are not accounted for in this study. Compensation and other CEO 
characteristics likely play a role in within-firm investment decisions (Stein, 2003). 
Additionally, external influences such as regulation or taxes can influence a firm’s scope 
of operations (Brickley & Van Drunen, 1990). Firms might divest operations if they 
believe that they are undervalued because shareholders are unable to decipher an overly 
complex organizational design. A refocusing of operations can reduce the opaqueness 
and information asymmetry associated with operating a conglomerate firm (Bushman et 
al., 2004; Chen & Zhang, 2007). Nevertheless, such divestiture decisions likely consider 
the relative efficiency of the firm’s operations. 
Certain firm strategies might lead to resource reallocation decisions inconsistent 
with relative efficiency as defined in this study. For example, long–run acquisition 
programs can impact the resources reallocated to segments, regardless of the relative 
performance of the firm’s divisions. Finally, as discussed above, managers might 
opportunistically use the discretion allowed under segment-reporting regulations to 









 Resource Reallocation Regression Results 
 
INVEST = α0 + α1KEEP + α2DROP + α3SEGLIQ  + α4LEV + α5LN(MVE) + α6MB 
    + α7FIRMCF + α8∆X_FIN + α9SEGQ + α10SEGN + α11SEGCF + α12DROP*SEGLIQ 
    + α12KEEP*LEV + α14KEEP*FIRMCF + Σ Year Indicator + Σ Industry Indicator + ε               (1)  
Dependent Variable  %∆AT %∆RSS 
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(-1.35) 
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(-0.27) 
 




-0.087                
(-0.92) 
 
-0.067                        
(-0.88) 
    
Adj. R2  0.134 0.033 
Observations Used  15,031 15,031 
This table reports the results of estimating equation (1). Regression coefficient 
estimates are shown with t-statistics in parentheses. Variable subscripts are suppressed. 













Corporate Governance Regression Results 
 
DROPSUM = γ0 + γ1 INDEP + γ2 SEGLIQ + γ3 LEV+ γ4 LN (MVE)  + γ5 MB   
        + γ6 FIRMCF + γ7 ∆X_FIN + γ8 SEGQ + γ9 SEGN + γ10 SEGCF + ε                                        (2) 
Independent Variables Predicted Sign 
 
DROPSUM 
Intercept ? 2.015        
(9.68) 
INDEP - -0.053                   
(-2.28) 
SEGLIQ - 0.078                 
(3.33) 
LEV + 0.052                      
(1.15) 
LN(MVE) + 0.082                      
(3.05) 
MB + 0.009                
(0.40) 
FIRMCF ? 1.879               
(3.26) 
∆X_FIN ? -0.658                      
(-1.49) 
SEGQ - 0.015                     
 (0.18) 
SEGN - -0.002                      
(-0.06) 
SEGCF - -3.73                     
 (-16.79) 
   
Adj. R2  0.202 
Observations Used  1,176 
This table reports the results of estimating equation (2). Regression coefficient 
estimates are shown with t-statistics in parentheses. Variable subscripts are suppressed. 
DROPSUM is the number of DROPs assigned to a segment over the four-year period t-
3 through t. INDEP represents increasing quintiles of the percentage of independent 















Firm Resource Reallocation Decisions: Predicted Versus Actual 
 
Panel A:  %∆ADJAT 







F_DOES = 0 
% Total Firm-
Years 
1999  477 52 % 439 48 % 916 
2000  572 64 % 325 36 % 897 
2001  541 65 % 288 35 % 829 
2002  523 66 % 272 34 % 795 
2003  517 68 % 246 32 % 763 
2004  534 69 % 239 31 % 773 
2005  550 70 % 240 30 % 790 
2006  535 73 % 199 27 % 734 
2007  474 70 % 201 30 % 675 
2008  415 68 % 199 32 % 614 
Total  5,138  2,648  7,786 
  66%  34%  100% 
Panel B:  %∆RSS 
1999  564 62% 352 38% 916 
2000  553 62% 344 38% 897 
2001  551 66% 278 34% 829 
2002  498 63% 297 37% 795 
2003  482 63% 281 37% 763 
2004  516 67% 257 33% 773 
2005  516 65% 274 35% 790 
2006  491 67% 243 33% 734 
2007  451 67% 224 33% 675 
2008  390 64% 224 36% 614 
Total  5,012  2,774  7,786 
  64%  36%  100% 
This table presents annual firm-year observations partitioned by whether the firm’s actual 
resource reallocation decisions in year t+1 match ex ante predictions of year t. F_DOES 
is an indicator variable set to one when at least half of firms’ segment resource 
reallocations match predictions, and zero otherwise. %∆ADJAT is the percentage 
change in assets of a segment adjusted to remove the segment’s results of operations. 
%∆RSS is the percent change from the prior year in relative segment size, where 
relative segment size is calculated as segment assets over firm assets. Panel A shows 
the results when the determination of whether a firm’s actions agree with predictions is 
based on the percentage change of assets allocated to segments (after removing the 
impact of segment results of operations). Panel B presents firm-year observations where 
the determination of whether a firm’s resource reallocation decisions agree with 







Firm Resource Reallocation Decisions: Predicted Versus Actual 
Industry Distribution  
 





















Panel A: NAICS sector       
Accommod,  
Food Svc 
146 69% 67 31% 145 68% 68 32% 
Admin, Support 157 69% 72 31% 153 67% 76 33% 
Agriculture, 
Forestry 
35 69% 16 31% 36 71% 15 29% 
Art, 
Entertainment 
59 72% 23 28% 52 63% 30 37% 
Construction 112 71% 45 29% 113 72% 44 28% 
Educational 
Services 
23 59% 16 41% 24 62% 15 38% 
Insurance 19 90% 2 10% 14 81% 4 19% 
Health Care, 
Soc. Asst. 
75 60% 49 40% 75 60% 49 40% 
Information 454 64% 255 36% 442 62% 267 38% 
Manufacturing 2,805 66% 1,460 34% 2,743 64% 1,522 36% 
Mining 185 63% 110 37% 180 61% 115 39% 
Other Services 13 52% 12 48% 17 68% 8 32% 
Prof, Scientific, 
Tech 
267 65% 145 35% 260 63% 152 37% 
Real Estate, 
Rental  
23 50% 23 50% 31 67% 15 33% 
Retail Trade 208 69% 95 31% 193 64% 110 36% 
Transportation, 
Warehousing. 
194 70% 85 30% 187 67% 92 33% 
Unclassified 28 61% 18 39% 31 67% 15 33% 
Wholesale 
Trade 
335 68% 155 32% 313 64% 177 36% 
Total 5,138  2,648  5,012  2,774  
 66%  34%  64%  36%  
        
Panel B: Industry Lifecycle Stage 
Growth 2,309 66% 1,179 34% 2,258 64% 1,287 36% 
Tech. Change 789 68% 364 32% 758 64% 429 36% 
Consolidation 635 67% 309 33% 602 64% 334 36% 
Decline 1,405 64% 796 36% 1,394 66% 724 34% 
Total 5,138  2,648  5,012  2,774  
 66%  34%  64%  36%  
This table reports the industry distribution of firm-year observations partitioned by 
whether a firm’s segment-level resource reallocation decisions match ex ante 
predictions of KEEP and DROP. Panel B shows the same breakdown by industry 




Table 8 continued 
 
segment resource reallocations match predictions, and zero otherwise. %∆ADJAT is the 
percentage of change in assets of a segment adjusted to remove the segment’s results of 
operations. %∆RSS is the percentage of change from the prior year in relative segment 
size where relative segment size is calculated as segment assets over firm assets. 
Appendix B provides a detailed description of the industry lifecycle stage calculations. 







Firm Resource Reallocation Decisions: Predicted Versus Actual 
Univariate Analysis of Firm Characteristics and Future Performance Measures 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics at time t 




















Difference   
(z-stat) 
 
 N = 5,138 N = 2,648  N = 5,138 N = 2,648  
SEGN 2.91 2.95 -1.67 3.00 3.00   1.49 
MVE 3,252.22 3,512.55 -0.60 395.91 256.45 5.29*** 
MB 2.29 2.46 -1.61 1.75 1.67 2.19** 
LEV 0.63 0.72 -1.29 0.36 0.35    0.22 
∆X_FIN 0.01 0.02 -1.37 -0.01 -0.01    0.71 
Panel B: Performance Measures at time t+1  
 N = 5,138 N = 2,648  N = 5,138 N = 2,648  
ROA 0.05 0.02 5.34*** 0.07 0.06 4.66*** 
ROE 0.16 0.11 3.05*** 0.18 0.16 3.41*** 
NI_AT -0.01 -0.04 4.66*** 0.03 0.03 4.68*** 
OPEPS 0.96 0.79 3.66*** 0.74 0.58 4.24*** 
EPS 0.69 0.49 3.59*** 0.64 0.45 4.36*** 
Panel C: Performance Measures at time t+2 
 N = 4,138 N = 2,130  N = 4,138 N = 2,130  
ROA 0.05 0.03 3.94*** 0.07 0.07 3.24*** 
ROE 0.16 0.14    0.62 0.18 0.17   1.73* 
NI_AT -0.01 -0.03 3.22*** 0.03 0.03 2.75*** 
OPEPS 1.04 0.88 3.20*** 0.81 0.64 3.72*** 
EPS 0.75 0.56 2.78*** 0.68 0.52 3.47*** 
Panel D: Performance Measures at time t+3 
 N = 3,279 N = 1,732  N = 3,279 N = 1,732  
ROA 0.06 0.04 2.47*** 0.07 0.07   1.86* 
ROE 0.18 0.17     0.08 0.19 0.18   0.84 
NI_AT 0.00 -0.01 1.98** 0.04 0.03   1.38 
OPEPS 1.14 0.94   3.51*** 0.90 0.73 3.69*** 
EPS 0.83 0.66 2.36** 0.74 0.62 3.08*** 
This table reports a univariate analysis contrasting firm-years where segment-level 
resource reallocation decisions match ex ante predictions of KEEP and DROP against 
firm-years where resource reallocations do not match predictions. *, **, *** indicate 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. F_DOES is an indicator variable 
set to one when at least half of firms’ segment resource reallocations match 
predictions, and zero otherwise. Panel A presents firm characteristics, and Panels B 
through D present performance measures at times t+1 through t+3. F _DOES = 1 uses 
%∆ADJAT to measure resource reallocations; inferences do not change in untabulated 
















Firm Resource Reallocation Decisions: Predicted Versus Actual 
Regression Analysis of Future Performance Variables  
 
EARN_PERFjt+n = β0 + β1 EARN_PERFjt + β2 F_DOESjt + β3 LN (MVE)jt + β4 OIAD_LOSSjt +εjt     (3) 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: ROA 
Independent  
Variables 
F_DOES per %∆ADJAT  F_DOES per %∆RSS 
DV t+1 DV t+2 DV t+3  DV t+1 DV t+2 DV t+3 
N 7,244 5,891 4,710  7,244 5,891 4,710 
Intercept 0.017*** -0.013*** -0.005  0.195*** -0.15*** -0.005 
F_DOES 0.006** 0.005* -0.001  0.001 0.006** -0.001 
        
Adj. R2 0.70 0.64 0.45  0.69 0.64 0.45 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: ROE      
Intercept 0.072*** 0.030 0.050*  0.078*** -0.002 0.027 
F_DOES 0.028* -0.018 -0.010  0.017 0.032* 0.026 
        
Adj. R2 0.17 0.14 0.06  0.17 0.14 0.07 
     
Panel C: Dependent Variable: NI_AT     
Intercept -0.047*** -0.042*** -0.021**  -0.034*** -0.042*** -0.023*** 
F_DOES 0.015*** 0.011** 0.002  -0.006 0.010** 0.004 
        
Adj. R2 0.43 0.37 0.24  0.43 0.37 0.24 
     
Panel D: Dependent Variable: OPEPS     
Intercept -0.108** -0.292*** -0.332***  -0.086* -0.315*** -0.262*** 
F_DOES -0.007 0.050 0.086*  -0.027 0.083** -0.029 
        
Adj. R2 0.60 0.54 0.37  0.59 0.54 0.37 
      
Panel E: Dependent Variable: EPS      
Intercept -0.426*** -0.404*** -0.359***  -0.349*** -0.417*** -0.311*** 
F_DOES 0.066 0.069 0.072  -0.057 0.085 -0.007 
        
Adj. R2 0.38 0.31 0.17  0.38 0.31 0.17 
This table reports regression results of equation (3) where F_DOES is the variable of 
interest. Regression coefficients estimates are shown, and *, **, *** indicate 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Results for control variables are 











Firm Resource Reallocation Decisions: Predicted Versus Actual 
Regression Analysis of Future Performance Variables 
  
EARN_PERFjt+n = λ0 + λ1EARN_PERFjt + λ2PCTGOODjt + λ3LN (MVE)jt + λ4OIAD_LOSSjt +εjt      (4)                                           
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: ROA 
Independent 
Variables PCTGOOD per %∆ADJAT PCTGOOD per %∆RSS 
  DV t+1 DV t+2 DV t+3 DV t+1 DV t+2 DV t+3 
     
N  7,244 5,891 4,710 7,244 5,891 4,710 
Intercept  0.017*** -0.012*** -0.005 0.019*** -0.015*** -0.004 
PCTGOOD 0.006** 0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.008** -0.003 
        
Adj. R2  0.70 0.64 0.45 0.70 0.64 0.45 
      
Panel B: Dependent Variable: ROE     
Intercept  0.071*** 0.029 0.05* 0.073*** 0.001 0.030 
PCTGOOD 0.034* -0.021 -0.018 0.029 0.034* 0.027 
        
Adj. R2  0.17 0.14 0.05 0.17 0.14 0.06 
      
Panel C: Dependent Variable: NI_AT     
Intercept  -0.045*** -0.038*** -0.019** -0.033 -0.041*** -0.021** 
PCTGOOD 0.013*** 0.006 -0.002 -0.008* 0.011* 0.00 
        
Adj. R2  0.43 0.37 0.24 0.43 0.37 0.24 
      
Panel D: Dependent Variable: OPEPS     
Intercept  -0.100** -0.277*** -0.310*** -0.080* -0.312*** -0.256*** 
PCTGOOD -0.006 0.029 0.058 -0.04 .0094** -0.047 
        
Adj. R2  0.60 0.54 0.37 0.60 0.54 0.37 
      
Panel E: Dependent Variable: EPS     
Intercept  -0.412*** -0.389*** -0.329*** -0.349*** -0.413*** -0.29*** 
PCTGOOD 0.048 0.052 0.026 -0.069 0.096 -0.031 
        
Adj. R2  0.38 0.31 0.17 0.38 0.31 0.17 
This table reports regression results of equation 4 where PCTGOOD is the variable of 
interest. Regression coefficients estimates are shown, and *, **, *** indicate 
significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Results for control variables are 















 Resource Reallocation Regression Results: “Cleaner” KEEP and DROP 
 
INVEST = α0 + α1KEEP + α2DROP + α3SEGLIQ  + α4LEV + α5LN(MVE) + α6MB + α7FIRMCF 
    + α8∆X_FIN + α9SEGQ + α10SEGN + α11SEGCF + α12DROP*SEGLIQ + α12KEEP*LEV 
    + α14KEEP*FIRMCF + Σ Year Indicator + Σ Industry Indicator + ε                                          (1) 
Dependent Variable Predicted %∆AT %∆RSS 
Independent Variables Sign   
















LEV ? -0.003                
(-1.54) 
-0.001                
(-0.67) 
LN(MVE) + 0.018         
(10.16) 
0.003         
(2.49) 
MB + 0.004           
(2.86) 
-0.000           
(-0.07) 
FIRMCF ? 0.302           
(4.68) 
-0.028           
(-5.89) 
∆X_FIN ? 0.659         
(16.03) 
-0.346         
(-11.57) 
SEGQ + -0.003              
(-0.51) 
-0.001              
(-0.10) 
SEGN - -0.015                
(-5.20) 
-0.014                
(-5.24) 
SEGCF + 0.022           
(3.82) 
0.014           
(3.16) 
DROP * LIQ + 0.011            
(2.10) 
0.006            
(1.43) 
KEEP * LEV - -0.002                
(-0.88) 
0.002                
(0.83) 
KEEP * FIRMCF + 0.151                
(1.88) 
0.016                
(0.21) 
    
Adj. R2  0.114 0.035 
Observations Used  12,792 12,792 
This table reports the results of estimating equation (1). Regression coefficient 
estimates are shown with t-statistics in parentheses. Variable subscripts are 









Corporate Governance Regression Results: “Cleaner” KEEP and DROP 
 
DROPSUM = γ0 + γ1 INDEP + γ2 SEGLIQ + γ3 LEV+ γ4 LN (MVE)  + γ5 MB  





Intercept ? 2.013        
(7.55) 
INDEP - -0.043                   
(-1.50) 
SEGLIQ - 0.084                 
(2.98) 
LEV + -1.044                      
(-0.73) 
LN(MVE) + 0.069                      
(2.09) 
MB + 0.046                
(1.59) 
FIRMCF ? 1.731               
(2.23) 
∆X_FIN ? -0.077                      
(-0.13) 
SEGQ - -0.02                      
(-0.23) 
SEGN - 0.028                      
(0.82) 
SEGCF - -3.82                      
(-12.46) 
   
Adj. R2  0.168 
Observations Used  814 
This table reports the results of estimating equation (2). Regression coefficient 
estimates are shown with t-statistics in parentheses. Variable subscripts are suppressed. 
DROPSUM is the number of DROPs assigned to a segment over the 4-year period  
t-3 through t. INDEP represents increasing quintiles of the percentage of independent 













Descriptive Statistics of Alternative Measures of Efficiency  
 
Panel A: KEEP & DROP KEEP DROP   TOTAL 
No. of segments classified  10,673 4,712   15,031 
      










No. of segments classified  1,007 4,814 668 5,278 11,767 
Percent of sample firms with at 
least one segment classified as 
10% 43% 9% 42%  
Mean (Median) dollar value of 










Mean (Median) percent of  
subsidy or transfer of end-of-










      
Segments assigned KEEP = 1 612 0 0 3,196  
Segments assigned DROP = 1 0 2,670 439 0  
Percent of segments assigned 
KEEP 
61% 0% 0% 61%  
Percent of segments assigned 
DROP 
0% 55% 66% 0%  
      





   
No. of segments classified  606 4,177   4,783 
Percent of sample firms with at 
least one segment classified as 
6% 34%    






   
Mean (Median) percent of  






   
      
Segments assigned KEEP = 1 225 16    
Segments assigned DROP = 1 34 1,756    
Percent of segments assigned 
KEEP 
37% 0.4%    
Percent of segments assigned 
DROP 
5% 42%    
This table reports descriptive information of alternative measures of efficiency 










Pearson Correlations of Efficiency Variables 
 
 















KEEP 1.00        
DROP -0.38 1.00       
BM03_EFF 
SUB 0.09 -0.10 1.00      
BM03_EFF 
TRF -0.14 0.21 -0.04 1.00     
BM03_INEFF 
SUB -0.41 0.49 -0.11 -0.09 1.00    
BM03_INEFF 
TRF 0.22 -0.25 -0.11 -0.09 -0.27 1.00   
BH07_EFF 
SUB 0.02 -0.04 0.59 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 1.00  
BH07_INEFF 
SUB -0.31 0.41 -0.06 -0.07 0.77 -0.21 -0.06 1.00 
This table presents Pearson correlations for various proxies of the efficiency of cross-
segment subsidies and transfers. Subsidies occur when a segment receives resources 
from a peer segment. Transfers represent resources provided to a peer segment. KEEP 
is an indicator variable set to one when a segment has a high relative ROA and is in a 
nondeclining industry, and zero otherwise. DROP is an indicator variable set to one 
when a segment has a low relative ROA and is in a nongrowth industry, and zero 
otherwise. BM03_EFF SUB (BM03_INEFF SUB) is an indicator variable set to one to 
represent an efficient (inefficient) subsidy following Billet and Mauer (2003; BM03). 
BM03 consider a subsidy efficient if the segment receiving the subsidy has a ROA 
greater than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s other segments. BM03_EFF TRF 
(BM03_INEFF TRF) is an indicator variable set to one to represent an efficient 
(inefficient) transfer. BM03 consider a transfer efficient if the segment providing the 
resources has a ROA less than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s other segments. 
BH07_EFF SUB (BH07_INEFF SUB) is an indicator variable set to one to represent 
an efficient (inefficient) subsidy measure following Berger and Hann (2007; BH07). 
BH07 consider a subsidy inefficient when the segment receiving the subsidy has a ROS 
less than the weighted average ROS of the remaining segments. All correlations are 

















 Resource Reallocation Regression Results: Alternative Efficiency Measures #1 
 
INVEST = α0 + α1BM03_EFFSUB + α2 BM03_EFFTRF + α3SEGLIQ  + α4LEV + α5LN(MVE) + α6MB + 
α7FIRMCF + α8∆X_FIN + α9SEGQ + α10SEGN + α11SEGCF + α12 BM03_EFFTRF *SEGLIQ + α12 
BM03_EFFSUB *LEV + α14 BM03_EFFSUB *FIRMCF + Σ Year Indicator + Σ Industry Indicator + ε          (1) 





















LEV ? -0.004                
(-1.35) 
-0.003                
(-1.79) 
LN(MVE) + 0.015         
(5.18) 
-0.002         
(-1.98) 
MB + 0.007           
(3.58) 
0.003           
(2.34) 
FIRMCF ? 0.437           
(6.26) 
-0.358           
(-7.61) 
∆X_FIN ? 1.151         
(11.59) 
-0.235         
(-4.81) 
SEGQ + 0.040              
(2.77) 
0.024              
(2.71) 
SEGN - -0.006                
(-2.26) 
-0.003                
(-1.19) 
SEGCF + -0.001 
(-7.27) 
-0.001      
(-12.79) 
BM03_EFFTRF * LIQ + 0.017            
(0.83) 
0.022           
 (1.39) 
BM03_EFFSUB * LEV - -0.024                
(-1.55) 
-0.024                
(-1.85) 
BM03_EFFSUB  * FIRMCF + 0.936                
(5.45) 
0.700                
(5.26) 
    
Adj. R2  0.074 0.014 
Observations Used 11,553 11,553 
This table reports the results of estimating equation (1) with BM03_EFFSUB 
substituting for KEEP, and BM03_EFFTRF substituting for DROP. Regression 
coefficient estimates are shown with t-statistics in parentheses. Variable subscripts are 









 Resource Reallocation Regression Results: Alternative Efficiency Measures #2 
 
INVEST = α0 + α1 BH07_EFFSUB + α2 BH07_INEFFSUB + α3SEGLIQ  + α4LEV + α5LN(MVE) + 
α6MB + α7FIRMCF + α8∆X_FIN + α9SEGQ + α10SEGN + α11SEGCF + α12 BH07_INEFFSUB 
*SEGLIQ + α12 BH07_EFFSUB *LEV + α14 BH07_EFFSUB *FIRMCF + Σ Year Indicator + Σ 
Industry Indicator + ε                  (1) 













BH07_INEFFSUB - 0.000  
 (0.07) 
 0.017  
 (0.96) 




LEV ? -0.004                
(-1.28) 
-0.003                
(-1.78) 
LN(MVE) + 0.015         
(4.71) 
-0.001         
(-1.54) 
MB + 0.006           
(3.28) 
0.002           
(1.76) 
FIRMCF ? 0.484           
(6.81) 
-0.334           
(-5.79) 
∆X_FIN ? 1.125         
(12.27) 
-0.261         
(-5.62) 
SEGQ + 0.038              
(2.52) 
0.019              
(2.07) 
SEGN - -0.007                
(-2.48) 
-0.003                
(-1.36) 
SEGCF + -0.001    
 (-1.59) 
-0.000     
(-2.49) 
BH07_INEFFSUB * LIQ + -0.019 
 (-2.19) 
-0.020      
  (-3.28) 
BH07_EFFSUB * LEV - -0.006                
(-0.43) 
-0.012                
(-1.23) 
BH07_EFFSUB * FIRMCF + -0.844                
(-1.08) 
-0.334                
(-0.98) 
    
Adj. R2  0.072 0.014 
Observations Used    
This table reports the results of estimating equation (1). Regression coefficient 
estimates are shown with t-statistics in parentheses. Variable subscripts are suppressed. 

















Diversified, multisegment or conglomerate firms, typically defined as those 
engaging in more than one line of business or one geographical area, account for more 
than half of US economic productivity (Maksimovic & Phillips, 2009). Yet whether these 
firms, on average, reallocate resources within the firm efficiently is a matter of debate. In 
this study, I introduce a set of efficiency measures that rely on an assessment of within-
firm comparative advantages, thereby avoiding two shortcomings of prior research: the 
evaluation of efficiency relative to potentially noncomparable single-segment firms, and 
the incorporation of error-prone proxies for growth opportunities using estimates of 
Tobin’s q.  
I find evidence consistent with firms’ reallocating resources across their divisions 
in a manner that reflects priority given to segments with the greatest within-firm 
comparative advantages conditional on the segment’s industry lifecycle stage. My results 
corroborate those of Maksimovic and Phillips (2002), who provide evidence suggesting 
that manufacturing firms grow across their industry segments efficiently based on plant 
productivity, and are in contrast to a line of studies documenting the cross-subsidization 
of underperforming divisions in multisegment firms (Rajan et al., 2000; Shin & Stulz, 




reallocate resources across their divisions. I also document that the efficiency of within-
firm resource reallocations varies with firms’ governance characteristics. 
There is significant potential for interesting future work on multisegment 
investment decisions. For example, the impact of vertical and horizontal relatedness of 

















SEGN  The number of segments reported based on unique segment 
identification numbers (SID) assigned by Compustat in the 
segment file. The number of SIDs is adjusted to reflect only 
economically meaningful segments. 
 
OIAD   Operating income after depreciation (Compustat OIADP). 
 
SALES   Total firm sales (Compustat SALE). 
 
ASSETS   Total firm assets (Compustat AT).  
 
ROA    Return on assets, calculated as OIAD, scaled by ASSETS. 
 
LEV Debt-to-equity ratio calculated as long-term debt, scaled by 
common equity (Compustat DLTT/CEQ). 
 
LIQ Asset tangibility measured as the sum of total current assets less 
total current liabilities divided by property, plant and equipment 
(Compustat (ACT – LCT) /PPE).    
 
MVE   Market value of equity calculated as annual fiscal year-end closing 
price x common shares outstanding (Compustat PRCC_C x 
CSHO). 
 
MB Market-to-book equity ratio calculated as MVE, scaled by 
common equity (Compustat (PRCC_C x CSHO)/CEQ). 
 
FIRMCF Firm cash flow measured as operating activities-net cash flow less 
cash dividends over average assets (Compustat (OANCF-DV)), 
scaled by average assets.  
 
∆X_FIN Net amount of cash flow from external financing sources 
calculated as net change in equity plus the net change in debt, 




received from the sale (and/or purchase) of common and preferred 
stock less cash dividends paid (Compustat SSTK - PRSTKC - DV) 
and the net change in debt equals net cash received from the 
issuance (or reduction) of debt (Compustat DLTIS –DLTR + 
DLCCH). This measure follows Bradshaw, Richardson and Sloan 
(2006). 
 
PCT_IND An estimate of the percentage of the board of directors that is 
independent or not affiliated with the firm. Employees, ex-
employees and individuals with legal or other affiliations with the 
firm are not considered to be independent. 
 
%∆AT Percentage change in segment assets calculated as the difference 
between current and lagged segment assets divided by lagged 
assets. 
 
%∆RSS Percentage change from the prior year in relative segment size 
where relative segment size is calculated as segment assets over 
firm assets. 
 
KEEP Indicator variable set to one when a segment has a high relative 
industry-adjusted ROA and is in a nondeclining industry, and zero 
otherwise. Segment ROA is t-1 segment operating profit, scaled by 
segment assets. Industry adjusting subtracts the industry median 
from the segment value where industry medians are calculated 
using the contemporaneous Compustat population of single-
segment firms in the same three-digit NAICS code. Chapter 4 in 
the text provides a more detailed description of the variable. 
 
DROP Indicator variable set to one when a segment has a low relative 
industry-adjusted ROA and is in a nongrowth industry, and zero 
otherwise. Segment ROA is t-1 segment operating profit scaled by 
segment assets. Industry adjusting subtracts the industry median 
from the segment value where industry medians are calculated 
using the contemporaneous Compustat population of single-
segment firms in the same three-digit NAICS code. Chapter 4 in 
the text provides a more detailed description of the variable. 
 
SEGASSETS Total segment assets (Compustat segment files AT). 
 
SEGLIQ The liquidity or tangibility of segment assets measured as the 
industry median of current assets less current liabilities, all over 
property, plant and equipment (Compustat (ACT – LCT)/PPENT). 
The measure is calculated using single-segment firms and assigned 





SEGQ An estimate of segment-growth opportunities calculated as the 
industry median market-to-book asset ratio (Compustat (AT - CEQ 
+ (PRCC_F *CSHO))/average assets). The measure is calculated 
using single-segment firms and assigned to segments using three-
digit NAICS codes. 
 
SEGCF Segment cash flow is measured as segment operating profit plus 
depreciation, scaled by segment assets (Compustat segment files 
(OPS + DP)/AT). 
 
DROPSUM The number of DROPs assigned to a segment over the four-year 
period from time t-3 through time t. 
 
INDEP Increasing quintiles of PCT_IND, sorted by industry and year.  
 
ROE    Return on equity calculated as income after depreciation, scaled    
                        by beginning-of-year common equity (Compustat OIAD/CEQt-1). 
 
NI_AT   Net income, scaled by total assets (Compustat NI/AT). 
 
OPEPS  Earnings per share from operations (Compustat OPEPS). 
 
EPS Earnings per share (diluted) excluding extraordinary items 
(Compustat EPSFX). 
 
F_DOES An indicator variable assigned a one when at least half of the 
firms’ segment-level resource reallocation decisions in time t+1 
agree with my ex ante predictions of KEEP or DROP in time t, and 
zero otherwise. 
 
PCTGOOD The percentage of a firm’s segments where the resource 
reallocations agree with ex ante predictions.  
 
OIAD_LOSS An indicator variable set to one when firm-level operating income 
after depreciation (Compustat OIADP) is less than zero, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
BM03_EFF SUB An indicator variable set to one to represent an efficient subsidy 
following Billet and Mauer (2003; BM03). BM03 consider a 
subsidy efficient if the segment receiving the subsidy has a ROA 
greater than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s other 
segments. 
 




following Billet and Mauer (2003; BM03). BM03 consider a 
subsidy inefficient if the segment receiving the subsidy has a ROA 
less than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s other segments. 
 
BM03_EFF TRF An indicator variable set to one to represent an efficient transfer 
following Billet and Mauer (2003; BM03). BM03 consider a 
transfer efficient if the segment providing the resources has a ROA 
less than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s other segments. 
 
BM03_INEFF TRF An indicator variable set to one to represent an inefficient transfer 
following Billet and Mauer (2003; BM03). BM03 consider a 
transfer inefficient if the segment providing the resources has a 
ROA greater than the weighted average ROA of the firm’s other 
segments. 
 
BH07_EFF SUB An indicator variable set to one to represent an efficient subsidy 
measure following Berger and Hann (2007, BH07). BH07 consider 
a subsidy inefficient when the segment receiving the subsidy has a 
ROS less than the weighted average ROS of the remaining 
segments. 
 
BH07_INEFF SUB An indicator variable set to one to represent an inefficient subsidy 
measure following Berger and Hann (2007, BH07). BH07 consider 
a subsidy inefficient when the segment receiving the subsidy has a 

















Following Maksimovic and Phillips (2008), industry lifecycle stages are identified 
using the long-run change in the number of firms in an industry and the long-run change 
in sales growth. As an alternative measure I also calculate changes in growth using the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) industry accounts of industry gross output (this is 
equivalent to the market value of industries’ production).  
Growth industries are defined as those where the long-run number of firms and 
long-run sales growth (or production based on BEA data) are increasing such that both 
are above the industry median. Consolidating industries are those where the change in 
long-run production is above the economy-wide median, and the change in the number of 
firms falls below the economy-wide median. Technological Change industries include 
those where the change in long-run demand is below the economy-wide median, yet the 
change in the number of firms in the industry is increasing. Finally, industries in Decline 
are those where the change in the long-run demand and the change in the number of firms 
both fall below the economy-wide medians. The 2x2 matrix illustrates the relation 







 Long-run change in number of firms  






Consolidating Growth above median 
Decline Tech Change below median 
 
 
 Long-run changes are calculated using the Compustat population of firms over 
two windows: 23-year, long-run change, and a 10-year, rolling window.20  
To allow for the possibility of industry lifecycle stages shifting during the sample 
period, I calculate the stages using 10-year, sequential, rolling windows. That is, I 
estimate a stage quadrant for each two-digit sector annually, using the current year and 
the prior 9 years. For example, to calculate industry lifecycle stages for the year 2000, I 
classify sales growth and the number of firms participating in sectors as above or below 
median values, based on data from 1991 (t-10) to 2000. I repeat this procedure for each 
sample year (1998 through 2007) dropping the earliest year and adding a new year.
                                                 
20Data for NAICS codes are available beginning in 1985, allowing for only a 23-year window. Prior 



















  Growth Tech Change Consol Decline Total  
NAICS 
Sectors 
Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %  % 
           
Accommod, 
Food Svc 
30 0.5 186 12.0 98 8.0 81 1.3 395 2.6 
Admin, 
Support 
180 3.1 243 15.7 10 0.8 33 0.5 466 3.1 
Agriculture, 
Forestry 
92 1.6 0 0.0 4 0.3 15 0.2 111 0.7 
Art, 
Entertainmt 
28 0.5 37 2.4 26 2.1 7 0.1 98 0.7 
Construction 233 4.0 17 1.1 9 0.7 37 0.6 296 2.0 
Educational 
Services 
59 1.0 0 0.0 1 0.1 4 0.1 64 0.4 
Health Care, 
Soc Asst 
150 2.6 13 0.8 6 0.5 83 1.3 252 1.7 
Information 417 7.2 7 0.5 38 3.1 941 14.6 1,403 9.3 
Manuf. 3,040 52.3 671 43.4 885 72.7 4,076 63.2 8,672 57.7 
Mining 168 2.9 198 12.8 13 1.1 210 3.3 589 3.9 
Other Svcs 29 0.5 0 0.0 4 0.3 8 0.1 41 0.3 
Prof, Tech. 
Scientific 
489 8.4 22 1.4 12 1.0 47 0.7 570 3.8 
Real Estate, 
Rental 
13 0.2 2 0.1 7 0.6 76 1.2 98 0.7 
Retail Trade 205 3.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 57 0.9 262 1.7 
Transport, 
Warehousing 
237 4.1 79 5.1 62 5.1 304 4.7 682 4.5 
Utilities 8 0.1 4 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 12 0.1 
Wholesale 
Trade 
436 7.5 68 4.4 43 3.6 473 7.2 1,020 6.8 
           
  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0   
Total 
Segments 
5,814 38.7 1,547 10.3 1,218 8.1 6,452 42.9 15,031 100.0 
This table reports segment distribution by industry lifecycle stage. NAICS sectors are based on two-digit 
NAICS. Industry lifecycle stages are calculated based on a long-run (1985-2008) median change in 




Table 18 continued 
 
description of the industry lifecycle stage calculation. A total of 205,069 firm-year observations were used 
to calculate the lifecycle stages. Lifecycle stages are then assigned to sample-firm segments based on 
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